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TIME TO LIFT THE VEIL OF INEQUALITY IN HEALTH-
CARE COVERAGE: USING CORPORATE LAW TO
DEFEND THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
Seema Mohapatra*
INTRODUCTION
Under the Affordable Care Act ("ACA"), large employers, except
for religious organizations, must provide employees with health in-
surance coverage, including health care related to reproduction,
from birth-control pills to pregnancy screening.1 This reproductive
health-care provision goes a long way to help close the inequality
gap that exists between insured women and men. However, some
corporations, owned or operated by religious families, have success-
fully argued that these reproductive health services mandated by
the ACA conflict with their religious beliefs and their rights under
the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act ("RFRA"). 2 In Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby, Inc.3 ("Hobby Lobby"), the Supreme Court held, in a
5-4 opinion authored by Justice Alito, that this reproductive health
care provision was unlawful as applied to the for-profit corporations
that felt that four of the forms of birth control that were to be offered
violated their religious beliefs and thus violated the RFRA.4 In
making this determination, the Court first found that the RFRA
does apply to for-profit, closely held corporations. 5 Although the ma-
jority opinion acknowledged that it is a legal fiction, Alito wrote that
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1. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014); see
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001-18121 (2012)).
2. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107
Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012)), invali-
dated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see, e.g., Hobby Lobby,
134 S. Ct. at 2766.
3. 134 S. Ct. 2751.
4. Id. at 2775.
5. Id. at 2759.
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a for-profit corporation could have religious beliefs. 6 The majority
argued that the companies do "[not forfeit] all RFRA protection
when they [decide] to organize their businesses as corporations ra-
ther than sole proprietorships or general partnerships."7 After de-
termining that the RFRA applies, the majority argued that the
"HHS [U.S. Department of Health and Human Services] regulations
substantially burden [the corporation's] exercise of religion."8 This
case, based on two circuit court cases involving the contraceptive
mandate-Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius9 ("Hobby Lobby ')
and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Secretary of U.S. Depart-
ment of Health & Human Services10 ("Conestoga Wood 1'). Conesto-
ga Wood I was heard by the Supreme Court in late March 2014.11
Both cases involved claims by corporations that the preventative
case requirements implemented by the ACA, particularly the con-
traceptive care requirements, are unconstitutional as applied to the
corporations.
In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court interpreted the RFRA and
ruled that for-profit, closely held corporations could exercise reli-
gion.12 This Article disagrees with the Hobby Lobby majority opin-
ion and examines this issue through a corporate law lens. This Arti-
cle argues that a shareholder's constitutional right to freely exercise
religion does not, and normatively should not, extend to the corpora-
tion itself, even in a closely held corporation. 13 Furthermore, this
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. (Hobby Lobby 1), 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff'd sub nom. Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
10. (Conestoga Wood 1), 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), rev'd sub nom. Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
11. Transcript of Oral Argument, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., de-
cided sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)
(Nos. 13-354, 13-356), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/i3-354
_5436.pdf.
12. Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2759. In the oral arguments in the Hobby
Lobby case, Justice Kennedy seemed to indicate his preference to decide these
cases narrowly without having to answer the question about whether corpora-
tions can "exercise" religion under the Constitution. Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment, supra note 11, at 7-8. Justice Kennedy asked:
Do I think of this as a statutory case? Of course, the First Amend-
ment is on the stage at some point here, but I take it you can prevail
just on the question of statutory interpretation, and if that is so, are
there any statutory rules that work in your favor, that is to say, avoid-
ing a constitutional question or how do we think about this case, pri-
marily as a statutory case?
Id.
13. This Article does not address additional issues brought up by the Hobby
Lobby case, such as whether the ACA Contraceptive Mandate "substantially
burdens" the "exercise of religion" within the meaning of the RFRA, and wheth-
er Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), which concerned the First
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Article argues that in the ACA context, allowing employers to opt
out of certain provisions of the ACA harms female employees, and
that this harm trumps the argument that somehow the beliefs of the
owners pass through to the corporation itself. To support this asser-
tion, Part I of this Article reviews the Hobby Lobby case and the
lower court Hobby Lobby I and Conestoga Wood I cases, upon which
Hobby Lobby was based. In addition, Part I reviews other recent
cases where for-profit corporations claim that certain ACA provi-
sions violate the religious rights of not just the owners and share-
holders of the corporation, but of the corporation itself (referred to
collectively as the "ACA Mandate cases").
Part II of this Article reviews theories of the corporation that
have historically been adopted by the Supreme Court and concludes
that regardless of the theory one ascribes to, the corporate-plaintiff
assertions in the ACA Mandate cases run counter to the prior prece-
dent of the Court.
Part III of this Article discusses corporate doctrine, declaring
that a corporation is a separate entity from its shareholders, even in
a closely held corporation. This Part also argues that a "pass-
through-beliefs" approach would be misguided and begin a slippery
slope that could lead to many additional inequalities in the work-
place.
Part IV of this Article explains the concept of Corporate Social
Responsibility ("CSR") and disputes the notion that some scholars
have asserted-that the CSR movement somehow "proves" that cor-
porations may indeed have religious beliefs. Rather, this Part ex-
plains that CSR is a normative concept that advocates for share-
holders and directors of corporations to make socially responsible
decisions that lead to a better society, including environmental ben-
efits and equality for women, minorities, and other discriminated-
against groups. In fact, the theory behind CSR comports with the
rationale for rejecting the notion that a corporate entity can have
religious beliefs that pass through from its owners. This Part also
examines how an employer providing contraceptive access could be
seen as a part of a corporation's corporate social responsibilities.
Finally, Part V of this Article describes how the ACA helps elim-
inate gender-based disparities that exist in current health insurance
coverage and the health-care system. It also addresses how the fo-
cus on the contraceptive provision has taken attention away from
the nonreproductive health-care provisions, which promote better
health care for women from disadvantaged groups. The public dis-
Amendment's Free Speech Clause, has any bearing on the outcome of Hobby
Lobby's and Conestoga's RFRA claims; this Article is only focused on the corpo-
rate law aspects of the Contraceptive Mandate cases. Additionally, this Article
will only specifically address for-profit corporations like Hobby Lobby and Con-
estoga Wood, not nonprofit corporations, limited liability companies, or partner-
ships.
139
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course of the ACA has essentialized women by focusing on their ca-
pacity as baby-making machines. In reality, the ACA covers a whole
host of preventative care services that will go a long way in closing
the gap in health-care outcomes for poor and minority women.
Women make up a larger part of the workforce in the United States
each year, and as employees, deserve equal treatment in all benefits,
including health-care coverage. The owners of the for-profit corpora-
tions who oppose certain contraception for religious reasons are not
required to use them, nor are they advocating their use when they
comply with the provisions of the ACA.
I. THE ACA CONTRACEPTIVE MANDATE CASES
Under the ACA, group health plans provided by employers and
covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act must pro-
vide specific types of health services, which encompass preventative
health maintenance.14 The ACA was enacted in March 2010, with
the legislative intent of expanding health-care coverage to include
numerous people who were then unprotected. 15 When the ACA was
enacted, there was a lack of standardization about preventative care
for women prescribed by the Health Resources and Services Admin-
istration ("HRSA").16 The United States Department of Health and
Human Services ("HHS") wished to decrease the number of unwant-
ed pregnancies and thus increase the number of intended pregnan-
cies from fifty-one to fifty-six percent. 17 Therefore, the HHS relied
on recommendations by the Institute of Medicine, adopting such
recommendations to include coverage for "[aill Food and Drug Ad-
ministration [FDA] approved contraceptive methods, sterilization
procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women
with reproductive capacity" as prescribed by a doctor.'8 Accordingly,
the coverage of the ACA extends to give access to family planning
services to all women, regardless of socioeconomic status, thereby
helping to reduce the amount of unwanted pregnancies and facilitat-
ing a fade in the discrepancies between public and private health
insurance plans. 19
With the enactment of the ACA, and through the directives
from HHS, employee group health plans must include the twenty
14. Hobby Lobby I, 723 F.3d at 1122-23 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2012)
and 29 U.S.C. § 1185d (2012)).
15. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001-18121 (2012)); Chad Brooker,
Making Contraception Easier to Swallow: Background and Religious Challenges
to the HHS Rule Mandating Coverage of Contraceptives, 12 U. MD. L.J. RACE,
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 169, 175 (2012).
16. Hobby Lobby I, 723 F.3d at 1123.
17. Brooker, supra note 15, at 174.
18. Hobby Lobby I, 723 F.3d at 1123 (quoting 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8725 (Feb.
15, 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
19. See Brooker, supra note 15, at 195.
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FDA approved contraceptive methods, including sixteen methods
that function by preventing fertilization and four methods that work
by preventing implantation of fertilized eggs. 20 The latter methods
include two types of intrauterine devices ("IUDs") and the two emer-
gency contraceptives known as Plan B and Ella. 2 1 There are four
enumerated types of organizations that are exempt from covering
the twenty contraceptives, including religious employers, nonprofit
religious institutions or higher education organizations maintaining
religious objections, organizations that qualify under 42 U.S.C.
§ 18011(a)(2) to be grandfathered, and businesses with fewer than
fifty employees. 22 There is no exemption listed for for-profit organi-
zations. 23 As of May 2014, there were forty-eight cases pending,
which were filed by for-profit organizations challenging the contra-
ceptive mandate, including the Supreme Court cases Hobby Lobby
and Conestoga Wood.24 Of the cases that received rulings on the
merits by May 2014, thirty-four had preliminary injunctions grant-
ed, while only six had their injunctions denied.25 In June 2014, the
Supreme Court decided the Hobby Lobby case, which consolidated
the Hobby Lobby I and Conestoga Wood I decisions. In this Part, I
first outline the lower court cases that led to Hobby Lobby, and then
detail the reasoning of the Hobby Lobby Court.
A. Hobby Lobby I
The most (in)famous of the Contraceptive Mandate cases is the
case brought by Hobby Lobby, a chain of arts and crafts stores and a
related business Mardel, a Christian bookstore chain.26 Both corpo-
rations are S corporations, privately held by the Green family.27
However, Hobby Lobby is not a typical "mom-and-pop" operation.
Hobby Lobby has over 30,000 full time employees and operates 626
stores in forty-seven states. 28
20. See Hobby Lobby I, 723 F.3d at 1123.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 1123-24.
23. See id. at 1124.
24. See HHS Mandate Information Center, BECKET FUND,
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral] (last visited Feb. 10, 2015).
25. See id.
26. Hobby Lobby I, 723 F.3d at 1121.
27. Id.
28. Our Stores, HOBBY LOBBY, http://www.hobbylobby.com/stores/stores.cfm
(last visited Feb. 10, 2015). Twenty-eight of the states Hobby Lobby operates in
require contraceptive coverage by insurers. Lara Cartwright-Smith, Benefit or
Burden? Religious Employers and the Patient Protections and Affordable Care
Act's Contraception Coverage Mandate, 18 NEXUS: CHAPMAN'S J.L. & POL'Y 29,
32 (2013). The states are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mex-
ico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. at 32-33. These states have laws that man-
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In Hobby Lobby I, the large, privately held, for-profit corpora-
tion and its owners the Greens sought a declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief, claiming that requiring them to provide health in-
surance coverage for what they dubbed abortion-inducing drugs and
procedures, educational materials, and counseling violated their
rights of religious freedom. 29 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
began by examining whether Hobby Lobby and Mardel had standing
to sue in federal court and concluded that standing existed because
the companies both faced an "imminent loss of money, traceable to
the contraceptive-coverage requirement" and because both would
"receive redress if a court holds a contraceptive-coverage require-
ment unenforceable as to them."30
The Tenth Circuit held that the corporations "absorbed" the re-
ligious convictions of their owners because the businesses are run
according to the Greens' religious beliefs. 31 To that end, "Hobby
Lobby closes on Sundays, refuses to promote alcohol consumption,
funds full-page ads 'inviting people to know Jesus as Lord and Sav-
ior,' and has a statement of purpose endorsing biblical principles." 32
According to the Tenth Circuit, such behavior helped give both com-
panies protection under the RFRA, which provides that if a law,
which applies to everyone regardless of religious affiliation, burdens
a person's exercise of religion then it should not apply to that per-
son.
Under the Tenth Circuit's reading of the RFRA, a corporation is
a person under the RFRA and thus has a right to exercise its reli-
gion.33 Judge Tymkovich opined that even though Hobby Lobby is a
craft store, "a religious individual may enter the for-profit realm in-
tending to demonstrate to the marketplace that a corporation can
succeed financially while adhering to religious values ... as a court,
we do not see how we can distinguish this form of evangelism from
any other."34 Thus, according to the Tenth Circuit, there does not
appear to be a limiting point for what corporations choose to, or
choose not to do, because of their religion. In the wake of this opin-
date that insurers covering prescription drugs must also cover the FDA-
approved contraceptives. Id. at 32. The state laws do include some exemptions
for religious organizations to abandon such requirements, but the qualifications
for exemptions vary by state. Id.
29. See Hobby Lobby I, 723 F.3d at 1123-25, 1141.
30. Id. at 1126.
31. Crystal Shepeard, Do Corporations Have a Right to Religious Expres-
sion?, CARE2 (Aug. 9, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.care2.com/causes/do-for-
profit-corporations-have-a-right-to-religious expression.html.
32. First Amendment-Free Exercise of Religion-Tenth Circuit Holds For-
Profit Corporate Plaintiffs Likely To Succeed on the Merits of Substantial Bur-
den on Religious Exercise Claim-Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723
F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), 127 HARV. L. REV. 1025, 1026 (2014) (quoting Hobby
Lobby I, 723 F.3d at 1122(internal quotation marks omitted)).
33. Hobby Lobby I, 723 F.3d at 1132.
34. Id. at 1135.
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ion, some are concerned about the slippery slope this reasoning
could create. 35
B. Conestoga Wood I
In Conestoga Wood I, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ana-
lyzed the identical issue very differently from the Tenth Circuit in
Hobby Lobby I, and concluded that a for-profit, secular corporation
cannot engage in the exercise of religion and the owners did not
have viable claims against the contraception mandate because the
mandate did not actually require them to do anything.36 In rejecting
the pass-through theory, the Conestoga Wood I court held that
"[s]ince Conestoga cannot exercise religion, it cannot assert a RFRA
claim. We thus need not decide whether such a corporation is a
'person' under the RFRA." 37
The opinion in Conestoga Wood I reminds us that general busi-
ness corporations do not exercise religion, even if its owners are de-
vout. 38 They do not pray, worship, observe sacraments, or take oth-
er religiously motivated actions separate and apart from the inten-
tion and direction of their individual actors. 39 Corporations have no
consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, and no desires. 40
The corporation was created as a distinct legal entity, with legal
rights, obligations, powers, and privileges different from those of the
individuals who created it or who own it.41 Corporations are sepa-
rate entities from their owners. 42 Corporations are not people. 43
The court therefore concluded that as a for-profit corporation, Con-
35. See Margaret Carlson, Say a Prayer for Hobby Lobby's Employees,
BLOOMBERG VIEW (Mar. 25, 2014, 5:08 PM),
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles
/2014-03-25/say-a-prayer-for-hobby-lobby-s-employees ("In Arizona, bakers and
photographers could have refused to make cakes or take pictures of same-sex
couples because the practice offended their religious beliefs .... What else
could businesses refuse to do in the name of freedom of religion? Hire divorced
people, maybe, or atheists, or even pay the minimum wage. After all, didn't
Jesus say something once about how hard it was for a rich man to get into
heaven?").
36. Conestoga Wood I, 724 F.3d 377, 388-89 (3d Cir. 2013), rev'd sub nom.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
37. Id. at 388 ("The Hahn family chose to incorporate and conduct business
through Conestoga, thereby obtaining both the advantages and disadvantages
of the corporate form. We hold ... that the free exercise claims of a company's
owners cannot 'pass through' to the corporation.").
38. See id. at 385.
39. Id. (citing Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278,
1291 (W.D. Okla. 2012), rev'd en banc, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013)).
40. Id. (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 466 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
41- Id. at 387.
42. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 415 (10th ed. 2014).
43. See Conestoga Wood I, 724 F.3d at 385, 389.
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estoga Wood Specialties could not engage in the exercise of reli-
gion.44
C. Other Contraceptive Mandate Cases Prior to Hobby Lobby
One of the first supporters of the idea of pass-through corporate
standing, such as the owners of Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood
suggest, was EEOC v. Townley Engineering & Manufacturing Co.45
In Townley, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the cor-
poration was an "extension of the beliefs" of its owners when the
corporation was facing an Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion claim for requiring its employees to attend devotional ser-
vices.46 Although the court held that the company had standing to
assert the shareholders' personal free exercise rights, it failed to
provide any standard to be applied in the future47
This idea was again asserted in Beckwith Electric Co. v. Sebe-
lius,48 where the court wrote that "any action that debases, or
cheapens, the intrinsic value of the tenet of religious tolerance that
is entrenched in the Constitution cannot stand," and therefore the
preliminary injunction was granted.4 9 Additionally, in a similar
Contraceptive Mandate case, Korte v. Sebelius, 50 the court took a
narrow approach. The court noted that because the RFRA does not
define "person," the Dictionary Act 5' must be consulted. 52 Thus, the
court held that by operation of the definition, the term "person" in
44. Id. ("We do not see how a for-profit, 'artificial being, invisible, intangi-
ble, and existing only in contemplation of law,' that was created to make money
could exercise such an inherently 'human' right .... We simply conclude that
the law has long recognized the distinction between the owners of a corporation
and the corporation itself. A holding to the contrary-that a for-profit corpora-
tion can engage in religious exercise-would eviscerate the fundamental princi-
ple that a corporation is a legally distinct entity from its owners." (citing Consol.
Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338, 346 (2002) (quoting Trs. of Dart-
mouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819)))).
45. 859 F.2d 610, 619-20 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d
at 386-87 (describing the factual predicate of the Townley case in which the
defendant corporation claimed its free exercise rights were violated by a provi-
sion of Title VII requiring employers "to accommodate employees asserting reli-
gious objections to attending ... mandatory devotional services").
46. Townley, 859 F.2d at 619-20 (quoting Brief for the Appellant at 35,
Townley, 859 F.3d 610 (No. 87-2272)).
47. Id. at 620 & n.15.
48. 960 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2013).
49. Id. at 1351.
50. 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Burwell v. Korte,
134 S. Ct. 2903 (2014).
51. 1 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (2012). The Dictionary Act provides general definitions
and interpretive instructions that apply throughout the United States Code,
both prospectively and retrospectively, unless otherwise indicated. See NicholasQuinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARv. L. REV.
2085, 2110 (2002).
52. Korte, 735 F.3d at 674.
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the RFRA includes corporations, unless the context indicates other-
wise. 53 Thus, the court's reasoning aligned with the Tenth Circuit
majority, remanding the case for the entry of a preliminary injunc-
tion on behalf of the plaintiffs. 54
Though the emerging trend has been to grant preliminary in-
junctions, there are courts that have taken a strong stance against
this concept of a free-exercise right, specifically as it would apply to
secular for-profit corporations. 55 For example, in Gilardi v. U.S. De-
partment of Health & Human Services,56 the co-owners of the
Freshway companies alleged the contraceptive mandate violated
their rights under the RFRA. 57 The district court denied the request
for a preliminary injunction, determining that the corporation could
not "exercise" religion, and thus no substantial burden on religious
exercise was demonstrable under the RFRA.58 The court found that
any burden on the Gilardis' religious beliefs was indirect.5 9 Howev-
er, the appellate court reversed the denial of the preliminary injunc-
tion for the individual owners (the Gilardis), but the denial for the
preliminary injunction was affirmed with respect to the Freshway
companies. 60
Similarly, in Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius,61 the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals concluded that the decision to comply with the
mandate fell on the corporation, not the owners, and that Congress
did not intend the term person to cover corporate entities like Auto-
cam when it enacted the RFRA.62 In Autocam, the court relied on
the Third Circuit's analysis in Conestoga Wood I and held that a for-
profit corporation "is not a 'person' capable of 'religious exercise' as
53. See id. ("In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the
context indicates otherwise[,] ... the word[] 'person'... include[s] corporations,
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock compa-
nies, as well as individuals... ." (emphasis added) (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 1)).
54. Id. at 687 ("Lifting a regulatory burden is not necessarily a subsidy, and
it's not a subsidy here. The plaintiffs are not asking the government to pay for
anything. They are asking for relief from a regulatory mandate that coerc-
es them to pay for something-insurance coverage for contraception-on the
sincere conviction that doing so violates their religion. They have made a
strong case that RFRA entitles them to that relief.").
55. HHS Mandate Information Center, supra note 24.
56. 733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013), vacated, 134 S. Ct. 2902 (2013) (mem.).
57. Id. at 1210.
58. Id. at 1210-11.
59. Id. at 1211.
60. Id. at 1224.
61. 730 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013), vacated sub nom. Autocam Corp. v. Bur-
well, 134 S. Ct. 2901 (2014), abrogated by Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
62. Id. at 627 (holding that solely "because courts have recognized the free
exercise rights of churches and other religious entities," it does not necessarily
follow "that for-profit, secular corporations can exercise religion" (quoting Con-
estoga Wood I, 724 F.3d 377, 386 (3d Cir. 2013), rev'd sub nom. Burwell v. Hob-
by Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)).
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intended by RFRA."63 Subsequently, plaintiffs Eden Foods and Mi-
chael Potter attempted to distinguish their challenges to the ap-
plicability of the ACA's Contraceptive Mandate from those raised by
the plaintiffs in Autocam.64 However, the court again held that
Eden Foods, a secular, for-profit corporation, could not establish
that it was capable of exercising religion and that the owner could
not establish his standing to challenge obligations placed only upon
the corporation, not upon him as an individual. 65
D. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.66 the Supreme Court
held that the RFRA requires that closely held corporations whose
owners have religious objections be exempt from compliance with
the portion of an HHS regulation with which their religious beliefs
conflict. 67 Justice Alito wrote for the majority and was joined by
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice
Thomas.68 The majority held that the regulation's application to the
corporations in question violated the RFRA because it burdened a
person's exercise of religion and was not the least restrictive means
of furthering the governmental interest asserted to justify the bur-
den on religious exercise.69
1. Standing
Justice Alito wrote that the RFRA applies to regulations of for-
profit corporations like the plaintiffs and thereby "protects the reli-
gious liberty of the humans who own and control those companies." 70
Justice Alito held that for-profit corporations are persons within the
meaning of the RFRA by referencing the Dictionary Act to show that
persons are defined to include corporations. 71 He also argued that
because nonprofit corporations have established rights under the
RFRA, he could not justify excluding for-profits. 72
The opinion addresses the corporate form.73 The majority inter-
prets HHS's position to be that
if these merchants chose to incorporate their businesses-
without in any way changing the size or nature of their busi-
63. Id. at 625.
64. Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626, 633 (6th Cir. 2013), vacated
sub nom. Eden Foods, Inc. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2902 (2014).
65. Id.
66. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
67. Id. at 2783, 2784 n.43.
68. Id. at 2759, 2785, 2787.
69. Id. at 2785.
70. Id. at 2768.
71. Id. (citing 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012))
72. Id. at 2769.
73. Id.
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nesses-they would forfeit all RFRA (and free-exercise) rights.
HHS would put these merchants to a difficult choice: either
give up the right to seek judicial protection of their religious
liberty or forgo the benefits, available to their competitors, of
operating as corporations. 74
The majority also seems to accept the legal fiction that a corpo-
ration can have religious beliefs, and that somehow the religious be-
liefs of the owners can pass through the corporate form.75 Alito
writes that this is a necessary fiction, as "corporations, 'separate and
apart from' the human beings who own, run, and are employed by
them, cannot do anything at all."76
2. Capable of Practicing Religion
The majority disagreed with the argument that the "RFRA does
not cover Conestoga, Hobby Lobby, and Mardel because they cannot
'exercise ... religion."'77 The majority argued that these parties "of-
fer no persuasive explanation for this conclusion. The corporate
form alone cannot explain it because [the] RFRA indisputably pro-
tects nonprofit corporations."78 Alito pointed to the recognized right
of nonprofit corporations to exercise religion to dismiss the argu-
ment that corporations in general cannot exercise religion.79 Alito
cited that state law authorizes corporations to act for any lawful
purpose, including religious purposes, and that many corporations
engage in religious and charitable activities that do not maximize
profit.80 Additionally, the advent of "benefit corporations," which
seek a public benefit and a profit at the same time, supports this
conclusion.8 1 The majority did not seem concerned that this opinion
was going too far. Because this finding was limited to closely held
corporations (which the Court never defined), the majority seemed
sure that there would be no slippery slope here.8 2
3. Substantial Burden on Religion
The majority opinion found that HHS had made accommoda-
tions to "religious nonprofits that have religious objections to the
contraceptive mandate, [and] HHS has provided no reason why the
74. Id. at 2767.
75. Id. at 2768.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2769.
78. Id. at 2756.
79. Id. The majority rejects the argument that for-profit corporations in
particular cannot exercise religion because their purpose is to seek profit. Id.
The Court points to the right of sole proprietorships to exercise religion while
seeking profit to show that profit and religion may be jointly pursued. Id.
80. I address this later in Part IV on corporate social responsibility. Corpo-
rations can do more than they need to do even if it sacrifices profit, not less.
81. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at at 2770-72.
82. Id. at 2775.
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
same system cannot be made available when the owners of for-profit
corporations have similar religious objections."8 3 It went on to hold
that the accommodation "constitutes an alternative that achieves all
of the government's aims while providing greater respect for reli-
gious liberty" and that "under [the] RFRA, that conclusion means
that enforcement of the HHS contraceptive mandate against the ob-
jecting parties in these cases is unlawful."8 4 The Court then stated
that their "holding is very specific."8 5 As such, the HHS regulation
burdened the exercise of religion by directing "the Hahns and
Greens and their companies" to violate their religious beliefs, and
that exercising this religious belief would have caused Hobby Lobby
to endure fines up to $475 million per year.8 6 Therefore, the Court
found that this was a substantial burden.8 7
Justice Alito rejected the argument that the plaintiffs could fol-
low their convictions (and also spend less than the fine) by forgoing
providing insurance altogether and paying a $2000 annual penalty
per employee.88 He noted that this argument had not been ad-
dressed by any of the parties, and was only brought up by amici, but
nonetheless found that such a ruling would ignore the plaintiffs' re-
ligious conviction that they should not provide health insurance.8 9
Additionally, he rejected the argument that the nexus between
providing insurance coverage for medications that can destroy em-
bryos and the moral wrong of an embryo's destruction was too re-
mote to constitute a substantial burden.90
Ultimately, the Court found that the application of the contra-
ceptive regulation to the plaintiffs substantially burdened an exer-
cise of religion protected by the RFRA and was not the least restric-
tive means of furthering the government's interest.91 Thus, the
Court held that the law required an exemption for the plaintiffs un-
der the RFRA.92
4. Concurrence
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy stated that the Court's
decision was based upon the compelling nature of the government's
interest in protecting the health of female employees. 93 Justice
Kennedy argued that the government was unable to justify "distin-
guishing between different religious believers" by refusing to use in
83. Id. at 2759.
84. Id. at 2759-60.
85. Id. at 2760.
86. Id. at 2774-76.
87. Id. at 2776.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2776-77.
90. Id. at 2777.
91. Id. at 2785.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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the case of for-profit corporations the same less restrictive means of
furthering its interests that it employed to accommodate nonprofit
corporations. 94
5. Dissent
Justice Ginsburg authored a dissenting opinion, and Justice So-
tomayor joined her.95 Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan joined in
part but would have decided the case on the merits without address-
ing whether for-profit corporations have standing under the RFRA.96
Justice Ginsburg called the decision one of "startling breadth" that
allows commercial enterprises to "opt out of any law (saving only tax
laws) they judge incompatible with their sincerely held religious be-
liefs." 97 Justice Ginsburg argued that the majority Court misinter-
preted the RFRA as a radical, blanket requirement of exemptions in
all cases, "no matter the impact that accommodation may have on
third parties."98 Justice Ginsburg would have held that the RFRA
does not apply to for-profit corporations because no pre-Smith99 de-
cision recognized a for-profit corporation's eligibility for a religious
exemption.100 Also because corporations are artificial legal enti-
ties1 01 and religious nonprofits hold a special and different place in
the United States than do commercial organizations. 10 2 Ginsberg
argued that for-profit corporations are different from religious non-
profits because the employees are not typically of one faith and are
legal entities distinct from their owners that exist for the purpose of
making a profit.103
Further, Justice Ginsburg would have held that the connection
between the religious objections and the HHS regulation "is too at-
tenuated to rank as substantial."10 4 She also found that the gov-
ernment's asserted interest in establishing "comprehensive preven-
tive care for women furnished through employer-based health plans"
was compelling. 0 5 Ginsberg's dissent also argued that the Court's
proposed less restrictive means, which provide care outside of em-
ployer-based plans, fail to promote that interest.106 Justice Gins-
burg warned that the Court's interpretation of the RFRA would lead
to future litigation raising more difficult questions, including how
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 2806 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
98. Id.
99. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
100. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2795-96.
103. Id. at 2795-97.
104. Id. at 2799.
105. Id. at 2803.
106. Id. at 2802.
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the religious beliefs of a publicly traded corporation could be deter-
mined and how disputes among a corporation's owners should be
resolved. 107
6. Critical Aftermath
The reaction to the Hobby Lobby case has been varied and po-
larized. 108 An editorial in the New York Times deemed that
the Supreme Court violated principles of religious liberty and
women's rights [in Hobby Lobby] which allowed owners of
closely held, for-profit corporations (most corporations in
America) to impose their religious beliefs on workers by refus-
ing to provide contraception coverage for employees with no co-
pay, as required by the Affordable Care Act. 109
Some argue that allowing corporations to decline to follow laws
will lead to unfair competition among business, as the assumption
was that corporations would obey the law and not claim legal waiv-
ers unavailable to competition.110 Additionally, the decision will al-
low those who oppose a federal law to avoid it, by simply alleging
conflicting religious beliefs.11 ' Further, a condition of incorporation
107. Id. at 2797 & n.19.
108. Compare Susan Berry, Pro-Life Community Celebrates SCOTUS Hobby
Lobby Decision, BREITBART (June 30, 2014), http://www.breitbart.com/Big-
Government/2014/06/30/Pro-Life- Community- Celebrates-SCOTUS-Decision-
For-Religious-Freedom-Against-Obamacare-HHS-Abortion-Pill-Mandate, and
Steven Ertelt, Supreme Court Rules Obama Admin Can't Make Hobby Lobby
Obey Pro-Abortion HHS Mandate, LIFENEWS.COM (June 30, 2014, 10:17 AM),
http://www.lifenews.com/2014/06/30/supreme-court-rules-obama-admin-cant-
make-hobby-lobby-obey-pro-abortion-hhs-mandate/, and Travis Weber, Hobby
Lobby Symposium: The Exercise of Religion Is Inseparable from Human Activi-
ty-Including Supporting One's Family, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30, 2014, 10:20
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/hobby-lobby-symposium-the-exercise-
of-religion-is-inseparable-from-human-activity-including-supporting-ones-
family/, with Kent Greenfield, Hobby Lobby Symposium: Hobby Lobby, "Uncon-
stitutional Conditions," and Corporate Law Mistakes, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30,
2014, 9:07 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/hobby-lobby-symposium-
hobby-lobby-unconstitutional-conditions-and-corporate-law-mistakes/, and
Wendy Mariner, Hobby Lobby-Part 2: Do Religions Get Their Own Facts?,
HEALTHLAWPROF BLOG (July 2, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com
/healthlawprof-blog/2014/07/guest-blogger-professor-wendy-mariner-hobby-
lobby-part-2-do-religions-get-their-own-facts.html#more, and Lauren Paulk,
'Hobby Lobby" Decision Means Rights for Corporations, but Not for Vulnerable
Citizens, RH REALITY CHECK BLOG (June 30, 2014, 5:57 PM),
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/06/30hobby-lobby-decision-means-rights-
corporations-vulnerable -citizens/.
109. Editorial, Hobby Lobby's Disturbing Sequel, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2014, at
A24.
110. Greenfield, supra note 108.
111. Mariner, supra note 108 ("If the courts leave it to these opponents to
decide when they are being substantially burdened, it will be difficult to enforce
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is that corporate entities act with "lawful purposes."112 However,
Hobby Lobby is asking the opposite-to not obey the law and also
not be held responsible for any consequences of the disobedience.11 3
Thus, opponents advocate that generalizations of clearly appli-
cable corporate law should have led the Court to reach the opposite
conclusion in Hobby Lobby. 114 The question should have been
"whether the nature of the government benefit-the corporate
form-is best seen as closely connected to the exercise of sharehold-
ers' religious beliefs."11 5 Additionally, opponents contend that the
Court's extension of religious liberties to for-profit corporations has
substantially changed the principle that "appeals to religious liberty
can never be used to justify harms to third parties."'116 As the dis-
sent pointed out, these changes are "startling" and "radical," disre-
garding the need to ensure equality for women. 11 7
7. Closely Held Corporations
Opponents claim that an additional mistake made by the Su-
preme Court is assuming that the decision will be limited to closely
held corporations. 118 The majority stated in its opinion that "[n]o
known understanding of the term 'person' includes some but not all
corporations," and additionally the Court noted that the limitation of
the decision as applied to closely held corporations is not definition-
al, but practical.119 The Court stated, "it seems unlikely that the
sort of corporate giants to which HHS refers will often assert RFRA
claims. HHS has not pointed to any example of a publicly traded
corporation asserting RFRA rights, and numerous practical re-
straints would likely prevent that from occurring." 120
the law fairly and uniformly. Employees-especially women-will be deprived
of government protection").
112. Greenfield, supra note 108.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Paulk, supra note 108.
117. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787-88 (2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see Paulk, supra note 108 ("[T]hey betray a shocking
disregard for the need to ensure the equality and full participation of women,
LGBT people, and other vulnerable minorities in our society. Those who say
that employees who do not like it can simply 'find another job' have clearly nev-
er struggled to find work, or been discriminated against on the basis of charac-
teristics like race, gender, national origin, disability, sexual orientation, or gen-
der identity.").
118. See Greenfield, supra note 108.
119. Id. ("Walmart, for example, is publicly traded. But a majority of its
stock is owned by the Walton family, and they could impose their religious be-
liefs on the company with ease. Nothing in the logic of today's opinion would
limit the company's ability to claim a Hobby Lobby waiver from, for example,
state laws like those existing in Massachusetts and a number of other states
requiring the company to not discriminate against LGBT employees.").
120. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 (2014).
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However, even assuming that the decision applies only to close-
ly held corporations, an estimated ninety percent of businesses in
the United States are closely held. 121 The IRS outlines a closely held
corporation as five or fewer individuals owning more than half the
value of the corporation's stock.122 In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg
noted that "closely held" is not the same as "small."1 23 Although
many closely held companies are small, some are extremely large,
well-known companies, such as Mars, Inc. with approximately
70,000 employees and Cargill, Inc. with over 140,000 employees. 124
Thus, even when assessing the decision's effects through the Hobby
Lobby lens, it is clear to see that the closely held analysis is not a
proper measure for a court to use in determining whether a corpora-
tion has religious freedom. Hobby Lobby itself operates over 600
stores, has approximately 30,000 employees, and is incorporated as
a for-profit company under Oklahoma law. 125 Although family run,
the decision allows the family's personal, religious views to be im-
posed on all the employees that work for the corporation. Addition-
ally, although the majority's ruling states that the decision is appli-
cable to contraception only, as other health services such as vaccina-
tions are governed by "different interests," "[w]hat this... decision
truly says when it juxtaposes 'different interests' with the health
interests of women and their dependents, is that women's interests
are not compelling, in their opinion."1 26
8. Influx of Cases
Additionally, it is important to note that the decision did not put
a restriction on claims against coverage for all of the contraception
mandated by the ACA.127 These claims have already begun, with
four lower court decisions being ordered for review since Hobby Lob-
121. Stephanie Armour & Rachel Feintzeig, Hobby Lobby Ruling Raises
Question: What Does "Closely Held" Mean?, WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2014, 2:56
PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/hobby-lobby-ruling-begs-question-what-does-
closely-held-mean- 1404154577.
122. Frequently Asked Questions on Entities, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Help-
&-Resources/Tools-&-FAQs/FAQs-for-Individuals/Frequently-Asked-Tax-
Questions-&-Answers/SmaU-Business,-Self-Employed,-Other-Business/Entities
/Entities-5 (last updated Jan. 1, 2014).
123. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2797 n.19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting
that there may be many future claims involving these large, complex enterpris-
es because the Supreme Court's majority failed to "offer any instruction on how
to resolve the disputes that may crop up among corporate owners over religious
values and accommodations").
124. Id.
125. Armour & Feintzeig, supra note 121.
126. Katerina Souliopoulos, Can a For-Profit Corporation Exercise Religion?,
CHLPI BLOG (July 2, 2014), http://www.chlpi.org/can-a-for-profit-corporation-
exercise-religion/.
127. Id.
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by. 128 Although it is not yet clear if the Hobby Lobby ruling will
have a dramatic effect on the implementation of the ACA, the inter-
pretation of the RFRA clearly allows for an array of claims that may
disadvantage employees, especially women. 129
This is highlighted in Ginsburg's dissent where she asks:
Would the exemption the Court holds RFRA demands for em-
ployers with religiously grounded objections to the use of cer-
tain contraceptives extend to employers with religiously
grounded objections to blood transfusions (Jehovah's Witness-
es); antidepressants (Scientologists); medications derived from
pigs, including anesthesia, intravenous fluids, and pills coated
with gelatin (certain Muslims, Jews, and Hindus); and vac-
cinations (Christian Scientists, among others)? 130
Regardless of the disclaimer by the majority, if there is not a
less restrictive alternative that does not offend an employer's reli-
gion, these claims also may hold weight on the same principle. 131
Although the majority states that the decision is to be narrowly ap-
plied to the facts of the cases before them, the reasoning behind the
cases will likely invite a host of new lawsuits that will result in dif-
ferent consequences. 132
9. Post-Hobby Lobby Effects
In April 2013, Michael Potter, the sole shareholder of Eden
Foods, sued the HHS alleging that the ACA's Contraceptive Man-
date was an "unconstitutional government overreach" as he is a de-
vout Catholic. 133 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
128. Id.
129. Wendy Mariner, Hobby Lobby-Part 1: Five Supreme Court Justices
Write Corporate Fiction, HEALTHLAWPROF BLOG (July 1, 2014),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/healthlawprof-blog/2014/07/guest-blogger-
professor-wendy-mariner-hobby-lobby-part- 1-five-supreme-court-justices-write-
corporate.html#more.
130. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2805 (2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
131. Mariner, supra note 129.
132. See Alex Park, How Hobby Lobby Undermined the Very Idea of a Cor-
poration, MOTHER JONES (July 3, 2014, 2:50 PM), http://www.motherjones.com
/mojo/2014/07/hobby-lobbys-other-problem.
133. Complaint, Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 2:13-cv-11229-DPH-MLAR
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 20, 2013), available at
http://www.thomasmore.org/sites/default/files/files/Eden%20Foods%20Complain
t-%20Filed%20032013.pdf, aff'd, 733 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2013), vacated sub nom.
Eden Foods, Inc. v. Burwell, 234 S. Ct. 2902 (2013); Clare O'Connor, Hobby
Lobby Fallout: Catholic Soy Milk Mogul Won't Cover Drugs That "Pre-
vent Procreation," FORBES (July 3, 2014, 2:07 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/2014/07/O3/hobby-lobby-fallout-
catholic-soy-milk-mogul-wont-cover-drugs-that-prevent-procreation (quoting
Michael Potter, Statement from the President of Eden Foods, EDEN ORGANIC
(Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.edenfoods.com/articles/view.php?articles-id=219).
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ruled that Eden Foods could not exercise religion as a for-profit cor-
poration.134 However, the day after the Hobby Lobby decision, the
Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case back
to the appellate court for further consideration consistent with the
Hobby Lobby ruling.135
Additionally, in Wheaton College v. Burwell,136 a few days after
the decision in Hobby Lobby, in another split decision, the Court
temporarily exempted a Christian college from part of the regula-
tions that provide contraceptive coverage under the ACA.137 In its
decision, the court said that all Wheaton had to do was notify the
government in writing "that it is a nonprofit organization that holds
itself out as religious and has religious objections to providing cov-
erage for contraception services." 138
It is unclear what the full implications of the Hobby Lobby deci-
sion will be for some time.139 However, the immediate effect, as not-
ed by the dissent, is to allow other "for-profit entities to seek reli-
gion-based exemptions from regulations they deem offensive to their
faiths," as already evidenced by the decisions following Hobby Lob-
134. Eden Foods, 733 F.3d at 633, vacated sub nom. Eden Foods, Inc. v.
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2902; see also O'Connor, supra note 133.
135. Eden Foods, 134 S. Ct. 2902; see also O'Connor, supra note 133.
136. 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014).
137. Id. at 2807; see also Adam Liptak, Birth Control Order Deepens Divide
Among Justices, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2014, at Al.
138. Wheaton Coll., 134 S. Ct. at 2807; see also Liptak, supra note 137.
139. One example of an interpretation of Hobby Lobby since the opinion was
published is the Satanic Temple, which indicated on its website that the ruling
gives women the option to opt out of state laws requiring a person to first read
informative materials (referring to "right-to-know" laws mandating women
must first read through literature containing alternative options to abortion) in
the abortion process. Cheryl K. Chumley, Satanists to Use Hobby Lobby Rule to
Skirt State Abortion Laws, WASH. TIMES (July 29, 2014),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/29/satanists-use-hobby-lobby-
rule-skirt-state-abortio/ ("Thirty-five states have these laws, 33 of which require
that the women receive specific information on the gestational age of the ba-
by."). The Temple's theory is "that any state-mandated information on personal
health that is not rooted in what its members see as scientific fact is a violation
of its own 'religious' beliefs." Id. Further, it was stated by the Temple's spokes-
person that
[wihile we feel we have a strong case for an exemption regardless of
the Hobby Lobby ruling, the Supreme Court has decided that religious
beliefs are so sacrosanct that they can even trump scientific fact ....
This was made clear when they allowed Hobby Lobby to claim certain
contraceptives were abortifacients, which in fact they are not.
Id. The group created a website whereby a woman can print out a letter to give
to medical providers to escape the informed consent requirements mandated by
state laws. See id. ("[W]omen who share our deeply held belief that their per-
sonal choices should be made with access to the best available information, un-
diluted by biased or false information, are free to seek protection with this ex-
emption whether they are members of the Satanic Temple or not.").
[Vol. 50
2015] INEQUALITY IN HEALTH CARE COVERAGE 155
by.140 Health-care providers and other business have previously
tried to use religious freedom arguments to justify discrimination
against employees and consumers based on personal religious be-
liefs.141 How the Hobby Lobby case will affect these decisions is to
be seen. As stated by the New York Times editorial board, "Mr.
Alito's ruling and a concurrence by Justice Anthony Kennedy por-
tray the decision as a narrow one without broader application, like
denying vaccine coverage or job discrimination. But that is not re-
assuring coming from justices who missed the point that denying
women access to full health benefits is discrimination."'142
10. Post-Hobby Lobby Changes
After the decision in Hobby Lobby, the White House sent out
communications stating that employers that do not cover birth con-
trol are required to be transparent about their objections. 143 The
website for the Department of Labor was updated to state that for-
profit corporations are required to include "a description of the ex-
tent to which preventive services (which includes contraceptive ser-
vices) are covered under the plan."144 If the company chooses not to
cover any of the contraceptives mandated by the ACA, it has sixty
days to tell employees. 145 This was in response to a U.S. Senate bill
that did not pass, which would have required employers to cover all
of the FDA approved contraception.1 46 The website information does
not give a new rule, it just reinforces existing law and gives new
guidance on the ACA and disclosure requirements for corpora-
tions. 147 The attempt was to make "clear that if a corporation like
Hobby Lobby drops coverage of contraceptive services from its
health plan, it must do so in the light of day by letting its workers
and their families know." 148
140. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2797 (2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Chumley, supra note 139.
141. See Paulk, supra note 108.
142. Editorial, The Court Limits Americans'Rights, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2014,
at A20.
143. Laura Bassett, White House: Employers Must Disclose Objections to
Covering Birth Control, HUFFINGTON POST (July 17, 2014, 4:59 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/17/white-house-employers-mus_n
_5595613.html?1405613322.
144. FAQs About Affordable Care Act Implementation (Part XX), U.S. DEP'T
OF LABOR (July 17, 2014), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq-aca20.html.
145. Id.; see also Bassett, supra note 143.
146. Protect Women's Health from Corporate Interference Act of 2014, S.
2578, 113th Cong. § 2; see also Basset, supra note 143 ("The bill would have
overridden a recent Supreme Court decision that allowed Hobby Lobby, a craft
supply company owned by evangelical Christians, to opt out of covering certain
contraceptives to which the owners religiously object.").
147. FAQs About Affordable Care Act Implementation (Part XX), supra note
145; see also Bassett, supra note 143.
148. Bassett, supra note 143 (quoting a senior administration official).
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The Hobby Lobby decision was decided on ostensibly narrow
RFRA grounds but stated that a corporation is capable of practicing
religion. 149 The majority was misguided in presuming that the reli-
gious beliefs of a closely held corporation would somehow pass
through to its owners. Such a conclusion is contrary to corporate
law, and the next two Parts of this Article attempt to examine this
issue through a corporate law lens.
II. THEORIES OF THE CORPORATION, CORPORATE PERSONHOOD, AND
THE CORPORATION'S CONTRACEPTIVE MANDATE ARGUMENT
As noted in Part I, the Hobby Lobby decision brings up the issue
of whether a corporation is essentially capable of personhood that
will be afforded the same constitutional protections as individu-
als.150 This issue is familiar in both the Hobby Lobby and Conestoga
Wood cases, as each in turn argues that the Contraceptive Mandate
of the ACA violates the RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment as applied to corporations. 151 However, neither
corporation will be afforded protections under the RFRA or the Free
Exercise Clause unless the corporation is deemed to have person-
hood.152 Part II of this Article examines the different theories of
corporate personhood that have been adopted by the Supreme Court
and analyzes whether a corporation may practice religion under
these different theories. The Supreme Court held in Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission'53 that corporations are entitled to
First Amendment protections regarding engaging in political speech,
thus allowing in some instances for a corporation to assert the same
rights as a natural person. 54 Yet, in its decision, the Court did not
specifically define or explain why or when a corporation can assert
such rights. 155 This Part details the history of Supreme Court deci-
sions, noting that that the Court has never conclusively decided the
corporate personhood issue, although there are many references in
Supreme Court precedent from the late nineteenth century that
suggest that the issue had been "definitively settled."156 Particular-
ly, when the prior decisions alluded to the existence of corporate
personhood, the Supreme Court did not clarify its capacity or mean-
149. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2769 (2014).
150. Malcolm Harkins, Hobby Lobby, Conestoga Wood, the ACA, and the
Corporate Person: A Historical Myth Bedevils the Law, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Apr.
18, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/04/18/hobby-lobby-conestoga-wood-
the-aca-and-the-corporate-person-a-historical-myth-bedevils-the-law/.
151. Id.
152. Id.
154. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
154. Id. at 365.
155. Harkins, supra note 150.
156. Id.
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ing or address why corporations hold some of the same rights as a
natural person. 157
Since the late nineteenth century, there has been little change
in the Supreme Court's view of corporate personhood. 158 The Su-
preme Court still recognizes corporate personhood in exercising con-
stitutional rights, but has never explained why or when corporations
can claim equal rights of a natural person. 159 The failure to define
the boundaries of such personhood, and the case-by-case approach in
its application, has led to confusion and conflicting opinions among
courts, particularly when deciding controversial issues such as ACA
Contraceptive Mandate challenges. 160
The introduction of the corporate form has led to much discus-
sion about the extent to which corporations should have the same
rights and duties as individuals. 161 There are three basic perspec-
tives concerning this discussion: (1) the fictional entity theory, (2)
the nexus of contracts theory, and (3) the real entity theory. 162
A. The Fictional Entity Theory
The fictional entity theory, also known as the concession theory,
is the earliest theory of the corporation and posits that the corpora-
tion is merely a creation of the State.163 This theory suggests that a
corporation exists at the allowance of the State, and thus is not enti-
tled to any rights not prescribed by statute. 64 The theory asserts
that "corporations are artificial, juridical fictions created by the gov-
ernment."'165 Therefore, this theory maintains that corporations are
subject to government regulations, and thus, as "creatures of the
[S]tate," they are based on a legal fiction-to be incorporated is a
concession provided by the State. 166
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of Corporate Groups: Corporate Identity
Reconceived, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 879, 891 (2012).
162. Id. at 891-92.
163. Atiba R. Ellis, Citizens United and Tiered Personhood, 44 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 717, 737 (2011); see also David L. Cohen, Theories of the Corporation
and the Limited Liability Company: How Should Courts and Legislatures Artic-
ulate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility and Securities Regu-
lation for the Limited Liability Company?, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 427, 437 (1998)
("Any history of the corporation that ignores the strong interest of the state in
the development of corporate law will necessarily be incomplete.")
164. Ellis, supra note 163.
165. Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Corporation as a "Real" Constitutional Per-
son, 11 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 221, 224 (2011).
166. Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L.
REV. 1629, 1635 (2011). Reification is the process of regarding something in-
tangible "as a material or concrete thing." Reification Definition, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reifying (last visited
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The early decisions of the Supreme Court reflect the idea that
the corporation is an artificial entity. In 1809, the corporation was
"defined as a mere creature of the law, invisible, intangible, and in-
corporeal." 167 It was also noted that "[y]et, when we examine the
subject further, we find that corporations have been included within
terms of description appropriated to real persons."168 In 1819, the
Supreme Court stated that a "corporation is an artificial being, in-
visible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being
the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which
the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as in-
cidental to its very existence." 169
In 1839, the Court again recognized in Bank of Augusta v.
Earle170 that the corporation only exists in the contemplation of law,
but the Court also stated that "yet it is a person for certain purpos-
es, in contemplation of law; and has been recognized as such by the
decisions of this Court."'171 However, the Court held that when cor-
porations make a contract, the contract is for the artificial legal enti-
ty, and not a contract of the individual members of the corporation.
The court further stated, "The only rights it [the corporation] can
claim are the rights which are given to it in that character, and not
the rights which belong to its members as citizens of a state.''172
The fictional or concessionary theory was dominant in the late
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but in many respects has fall-
Nov. 30, 2014). Reification takes the abstract category of a corporation and
treats it as a tangible entity. Dmitry N. Feofanov, Luna Law: The Libertarian
Vision in Heinlein's The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress, 63 TENN. L. REV. 71, 97
(1995). Viewing the corporation as an entity or "legal fiction" is a type of reifi-
cation. G. Mitu Gulati et al., Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REV. 887, 890
(2000). Critics of reification argue that although it may be a useful concept to
consider the firm as transacting as an entity, one cannot ignore the fact that
firms can only transact through individuals. Id. Reification has been criticized
and labeled as a "fallacy," because recognizing these separate entities leads to
ignoring that these entities do not in fact exist apart from the people who com-
prise the organization. Feofanov, supra. Therefore, these entities cannot have
rightful power that exceeds the power of the people who constitute it. Id. By
presuming the corporation "is both natural and apolitical," there is a presump-
tion that corporations are "good" or "bad," which further naturalizes the artifi-
cial entity. Martha T. McCluskey, The Substantive Politics of Formal Corporate
Power, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 1453, 1456 (2006). Thus, framing the issue in terms of
the "good" or "bad" corporation individualizes any substantive harm, which is
labeled as "morality divorced from serious politics" that confuses the matter of
an individual intention to do harm with an "unjust public power institutional-
ized in law." Id. at 1457.
167. Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 88 (1809).
168. Id.
169. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
170. 38 U.S. 519 (1839)
171. Id.
172. Id.
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en into modern disfavor. 173 Arguably however, the theory empha-
sizes the obligations of the corporation to follow generally applicable
laws, and a reintroduction of this theory would reproduce a sense of
public duty to the corporation. 174
Under the fictional entity theory, the corporations in the Con-
traceptive Mandate cases absolutely have an obligation to follow the
rules of the State, including all provisions of the ACA. As an artifi-
cial entity with positive obligations to the State, the corporations
would not be able to succeed in a claim that the ACA violates their
religious beliefs. Rather, the corporation would be deemed to have a
responsibility to the State, not to the owners of the corporation.
That said, the Supreme Court is unlikely to return to this theory
despite many scholars advocating that corporations have obligations
to the State and to its employees. 175
B. Nexus of Contract Theory
The nexus of contract theory, which has gained popularity espe-
cially among law and economics scholars and jurists, describes the
corporation as a legal fiction that is purely a central hub for a series
of contractual relationships. 176 The theory asserts that the corpora-
tion is simply a network of contractual relationships between and
among a range of individuals, such as managers, employees, and
customers. 177 The corporation itself is said to not really exist, rather
it is a nexus, or a connection, between such corporate and contractu-
al relationships. 178 This approach evolved from the emphasis on the
freedom of contract and was stimulated by a transformation in the
economy. 179
173. Marcantel, supra note 165, at 225.
174. Harper Ho, supra note 161, at 914.
175. Id.
176. Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Un-
raveling of "Nexus of Contracts" Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1129-30
(2011).
177. Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate Re-
sponsibility: Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1160 (2012).
178. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 176, at 1129.
179. Harper Ho, supra note 161, at 893. Proponents of the contractarian
model, such as Butler and Ribstein, argue that anti-contractarians
under-appreciate the extent of private controls on managerial conduct; mis-
characterize the role of liability rules as a limitation on, instead of a part of,
corporate contracts; underestimate the power of market forces as a constraint
on the development of optimal contracts; and fail to evaluate the inefficiencies
of their regulatory approach. David L. Cohen, Theories of the Corporation and
the Limited Liability Company: How Should Courts and Legislatures Articulate
Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility, and Securities Regulation
for the Limited Liability Company?, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 427, 433 (1998) (citing
Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Re-
sponse to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (1990)).
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The nexus of contract theory of the corporation strips away the
"personhood" argument to demonstrate how contractual relation-
ships between individuals form the core of a corporation 180 There-
fore, this theory rests not on a corporation's distinct legal existence
or separate legal status, but rather it rests solely on the rights of the
people involved in the background contracting for the corporation.181
However, the nexus of contracts theory has been criticized for
lacking well-defined boundaries in the definition of the group it pur-
ports to describe.18 2 Opponents of this theory argue that if employ-
ees, customers, or stakeholders are thought of as part of the corpora-
tion, or if the corporation is only seen as a nexus of contracts, the
boundaries of the corporation are not clear.'8 3 Therefore, some be-
lieve that the theory is not realistic in its picture of the corporation
and how the corporation should be viewed.184
Some supporters of the employers in the Contraceptive Mandate
cases believe that under a nexus of contracts theory, the corporate
plaintiffs will succeed.18 5 That is, they argue that the corporation
and the employers are one in the same and thus should necessarily
win the argument that the corporation's religious rights are the
same as those of the employer, especially in a closely held corpora-
tion.186 This view is incomplete, however, because when the corpo-
ration is a nexus of contracts, the contract between the employers
and the employees is also an obligation of the corporation.
In the case of an enormous closely held corporation, like Hobby
Lobby with over 30,000 employees, the contract between the corpo-
ration and its employees is at least as important as the religious be-
liefs of the employer-owners, the Green family. In looking at the
burden on Hobby Lobby, the corporation, the owners, the Green
family, and the employees when Hobby Lobby fails to comply with
the ACA, it is clear that the employees are the losers in this web of
contracts. The Green family is objecting to covering contraceptives,
which they believe to be abortion inducing. 8 7 Congress did not
180. Saru M. Matambanadzo, The Body, Incorporated, 87 TUL. L. REV. 457,
475-76 (2013). Nexus of contract theorists like Klein critique the reification
concept, arguing that it "is a device for making something that is in fact com-
plex seem simple, and that can be dangerous. In reality, only individuals enjoy
the benefits, or bear the burdens and the responsibilities, of actions affecting
other individuals." WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FI-
NANCE 117-18 (2010).
181. Matambanadzo, supra note 180, at 476.
182. Polman, supra note 166, at 1668.
183. Id.
184. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 176, at 1134.
185. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the Corporate Law
Professors' Amicus Brief in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood, 100 VA. L. REV.
ONLINE 1 (2014), http://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/virginialawreview.org
/files/BainbridgeFinal.pdf.
186. Id.
187. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2766 (2014).
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write a requirement in the ACA that the Green family use contra-
ception, and it does not require the Green family to hand out contra-
ceptives.'88 In fact, the ACA does not even require Hobby Lobby to
provide health-care coverage.189 Hobby Lobby can decide to pay a
tax penalty instead of covering health-care coverage if it is so op-
posed to the Contraceptive Mandate. 190 The link between the ACA
Contraceptive Mandate and the Green family's religious beliefs is
tenuous at best. However, to the 15,000 employees who would re-
ceive comprehensive health-care coverage were it not for these reli-
gious objections, the harm is palpable, immediate, and immense.
When weighing which "contract" is more important in this sce-
nario, it is plain that the burden on employees facing lack of health-
care coverage is much greater than the largely theoretical and sym-
bolic objection by the Green family. In fact, prior to filing its lawsuit
in opposition to the ACA's requirements of health-care coverage to
include family planning services, Hobby Lobby's employee insurance
plan already included sixteen of the twenty contraceptives required
by the ACA, including Ella and Plan B.'91 Plan B is one of the con-
traceptives that the lawsuit involves, and the CEO of Hobby Lobby
describes the contraceptive as "abortifacient."' 92 Thus, Hobby Lobby
was previously covering the drug its lawsuit condemns, and the
company responded that the decision was initially made by mistake,
and then later removed the coverage, prior to filing suit.193
Additionally, it can be argued that the owners of Hobby Lobby,
as directors and officers of a corporation, owe a fiduciary duty to the
corporation, including the employees themselves. 94 If the Hobby
Lobby employees lose their health-care coverage due to the Green
family's beliefs, that would harm a greater number of people-all of
the employees-and the harm would be more immediate and tangi-
ble than those claimed by the Green. Thus, even if one accepts the
188. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-48, 124 Stat. 119 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. Anastasia Golovashkina, Hobby Lobbying Against Obamacare, CHI.
MAROON (Apr. 15, 2014), http:/chicagomaroon.com2014/04/15/hobby-lobbying-
against-obamacare/.
192. Id.
193. Paul Monies, Hobby Lobby, Government Ask for Delay in Case over
Health Care Law, Contraception, OKLAHOMAN (Dec. 11, 2012, 8:47 PM),
http://newsok.com/hobby-lobby-government-ask-for-delay-in-case-over-health-
care-law-contraceptionlarticle/3736644.
194. Some have argued that employers have an even greater duty. Margaux
Hall contends that employees may be seen to have an entitlement to health care
under the ACA and that employers can be seen as owing a fiduciary duty to
their employees to provide such health-care coverage. See Margaux J. Hall, A
Fiduciary Theory of Health Entitlements, 35 CARDoZO L. REV. 1729, 1729 (2014),
http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/35-5/HALL.35.5.pdf.
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nexus of contract theory, I believe the employees' case is stronger
than the Greens'. Regardless of what the Supreme Court decided,
under the nexus of contracts theory, the government's argument
concerning the contractual obligations of an employer to an employ-
ee is more compelling than the corporation's argument that its reli-
gious beliefs against abortion are offended by contraceptives that
they believe to be abortifacients. 195
C. The Real Entity Theory
In contrast to the nexus of contracts theory, the real entity theo-
ry conceives a corporation to be a separate, distinct, real person that
is greater than the sum of its individual parts. 196 This theory is also
known as the natural entity or person theory and regards the corpo-
ration as existing separately from its shareholders and from the
State. 197 The real entity theory suggests that as a corporation is
separate and apart, the corporation has a "collective consciousness"
that is separate and apart from those who manage its operations. 198
Therefore, it is said that a corporation may then be considered a
person under the law and entitled to legal rights that would natural-
ly flow to any person. 199
The question of the corporation having the status of a person
under the Fourteenth Amendment went before the Supreme Court
in 1886 in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad200 where
the parties argued the status of a corporation. 20 1 However, prior to
oral argument, Chief Justice Waite was quoted as saying:
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question
whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person with-
195. There is no scientific support for the contention that any of the covered
contraceptives, including Plan B, Ella, and the copper and hormonal IUDs, are
actually abortifacients. Julie Rovner, Morning-After Pills Don't Cause Abortion,
Studies Say, NPR SHOTS BLOG (Feb. 21, 2013, 5:04 PM), http://www.npr.org
/blogs/healthl2013/02/22/172595689/morning-after-pills-dont-cause-abortion-
studies-say. The religious beliefs of the Greens, however sincere, do not com-
port with the science. Id. ("In federal law and medical terms, pregnancy does
not begin with a fertilized egg, but with a fertilized egg that has implanted in
the uterus. The contraceptives in question-Plan B, Ella, copper and hormonal
IUDs-do not cause abortions as the plaintiffs maintain, because they are not
being used to terminate established pregnancies.").
196. Teneille R. Brown, In-corp-o-real: A Psychological Critique of Corporate
Personhood and Citizens United, 12 FLA. ST. U. Bus. REV. 1, 37 (2013).
197. Pollman, supra note 166, at 1641-42.
198. Ellis, supra note 163, at 739.
199. Id.
200. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
201. Philip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational
Corporations, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 283, 308-09 (1990).
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in its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to
these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does. 20 2
Thus, there is disagreement among courts and scholars on
whether the Supreme Court had actually decided the question of
corporate personhood in Southern Pacific, affording Fourteenth
Amendment protections to corporations. 20 3 The argument against
being that the Court was not declaring that corporations were equal
to individuals in regard to constitutional rights, but rather, the
Court was merely asserting that the corporate interests were equal
to those of the shareholders, and as such, the Court sought to give
the corporation the same protections as shareholder. 20 4 However,
even though there was no discussion of corporations as persons in
the decision-the reporter deposited the Chief Justice's statement in
the headnote to the case-and therefore, the Southern Pacific deci-
sion is relied upon as having given corporations constitutional Four-
teenth Amendment protections.20 5
In a decision two years later, the Supreme Court voiced the idea
that was impliedly adopted in Southern Pacific, corporate person-
hood regarding the Fourteenth Amendment.20 6 In Pembina Consol-
idated Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania,2 7 the Court
stated, "Under the designation of 'person' there is no doubt that a
private corporation is included."208  Additionally, numerous cases
following and citing Santa Clara relate that the Supreme Court had
held that corporations are "persons" for the purpose of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 209 In 1896, the Court stated, "It is now settled
that corporations are persons, within the meaning of the constitu-
tional provisions forbidding the deprivation of property without due
process of law, as well as a denial of the equal protection of the
laws."21o
In the years following Southern Pacific, the Supreme Court con-
tinued to expand on the idea that corporations had some of the same
202. Southern Pacific, 118 U.S. at 396.
203. Blumberg, supra note 201, at 309.
204. Id. (citing Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development
of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 178 (1985)).
205. Tom R. Tyler & Avital Mentovich, Punishing Collective Entities, 19 J.L.
& Pol'y 203, 204 (2010).
206. Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S.
181, 189 (1888).
207. 125 U.S. 181.
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50 (1906) ("A corporation is enti-
tled to the same immunities as an individual."), overruled in part on other
grounds by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964);
Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889)
("[C]orporations are persons.").
210. Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592
(1896).
WAKE FOREST LAWREVIEW
constitutional protections as individuals. 211 The Court first held in
1896 that corporations are afforded the due process protections and
equal protections of the law. 212 The Court has also extended protec-
tions under the First Amendment for freedom of the press.213 In
Grosjean v. American Press Co.,214 the Court stated that it was a
necessary protection as the press is a vital source of information,
that "the suppression or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a
free press cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern,"
and that "[a] free press stands as one of the great interpreters be-
tween the government and the people ... to allow it to be fettered is
to fetter ourselves. 215
Additionally, the Court again addressed the extension of consti-
tutional protections for corporations in 1963 in NAACP v. Button,21 6
stating that under the First Amendment, and absorbed into the
Fourteenth Amendment, the freedom of speech and freedom of as-
sembly were not to be denied to the corporation.21 7 In Button, the
Court held that since the NAACP was defending civil rights, the "pe-
titioner may assert this right on its own behalf, because, though a
corporation, it is directly engaged in those activities, claimed to be
constitutionally protected, which the statute would curtail."21 8
In 1978, the Court again addressed the extension of First and
Fourteenth Amendment privileges to corporations, detailing when
such protections are purely personal or when these protections will
be afforded to corporations. 21 9 In First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti,220 the Supreme Court once more extended rights to a corpo-
ration, holding that corporations have a First Amendment right to
political expression. 221 In its reasoning, and in citing Southern Pa-
cific, the Court also stated that freedom of speech, encompassed by
the First Amendment, always has been viewed as a necessary com-
ponent within the Due Process Clause and that there has not been a
separation of such as applied to corporations. 222 The test laid out by
the Court is that "[wihether or not a particular guarantee is 'purely
personal' or is unavailable to corporations for some other reason de-
211. Tyler & Mentovich, supra note 206.
212. Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co., 164 U.S. at 592.
213. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 251 (1936).
214. 297 U.S. 252.
215. Id. at 250.
216. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
217. Id. at 428.
218. Id.
219. Zachary J. Phillips, Note, Non-Prophets: Why For-Profit, Secular Corpo-
rations Cannot Exercise Religion Within the Meaning of the First Amendment,
46 CONN. L. REV. ONLINE 39, 44-45 (2014).
220. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
221. Id. at 802.
222. Id. at 780.
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pends on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitu-
tional provision."223
More recently, the Supreme Court in Citizens United quoted the
Bellotti Court to reaffirm the notion that political speech is "indis-
pensable to decision-making in a democracy, and this is no less true
because the speech comes from a corporation." 224 The Court relied
on the decision in Bellotti to uphold the understanding that the gov-
ernment cannot silence political speech because the speaker is a
corporation, as there is no governmental interest in limiting the po-
litical speech of either a for-profit or nonprofit organization. 225 The
majority's approach in the Citizens United opinion implied a real
entity theory of corporations, indicating that corporations are "like"
individuals. 226
However, the theory is not without opposition. The argument
being that even depicting a corporation as a real entity does not ex-
plain why corporations are afforded the same constitutional protec-
tions as people. 227 Additionally, some suggest that the Court should
consider the purpose of the right at issue and whether it would pro-
mote the objectives of the right if it were given to a corporation. 228
When applied to religious rights, it is not at all clear that a corpora-
tion is practically capable of having such rights. There is a whole
jurisprudence on "corporate speech," so Citizens United was just ex-
tending this jurisprudence. 229 However, there is no counterpart to
corporate speech as "corporate religion." If the Supreme Court
grants Hobby Lobby such a right, it would be creating new corporate
rights, not extending existing ones.
The Court has adopted the real entity approach in recent deci-
sions and has refused to extend the constitutional protections in cer-
tain situations, where the protection is seemingly only "personal."230
For example, in Hale v. Henkel,231 the Court held that a person's
Fifth Amendment right to refuse to incriminate himself is "purely a
personal privilege of the witness" and that "it was never intended to
permit him to plead the fact that some third person might be incrim-
inated by his testimony, even though he were the agent of such per-
son."232 In addressing the Fifth Amendment and self-incrimination
223. Id. at 779 n.14.
224. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349 (2010).
225. Id. at 365.
226. Id. at 342-43 (observing that corporations should not be treated differ-
ently under the First Amendment only because corporations are not natural
persons).
227. Pollman, supra note 166, at 1630.
228. Id. at 1631.
229. Id. at 1655-57.
230. Phillips, supra note 219.
231. 201 U.S. 43 (1906), overruled in part on other grounds by Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
232. Id. at 69-70.
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in United States v. White,233 the Court noted that "the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination is essentially a personal one, ap-
plying only to natural individuals .... Since the privilege against
self-incrimination is a purely personal one, it cannot be utilized by
or on behalf of any organization, such as a corporation." 234
The Supreme Court has also addressed a corporation's right to
privacy, and has held that "corporations can claim no equality with
individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy."235 Also, in reli-
ance on Supreme Court precedent, such as the decision in Bellotti,
courts have held that corporations do not hold a right to vote, stat-
ing that "[t]he very nature of a corporation prevents it from sharing
an identity with the broader humane, economic, ideological, and po-
litical concerns of the human body politic." 236
Additionally, the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of ex-
tending the First Amendment protections regarding religious be-
liefs. 237 In Smith, two employees of a drug rehabilitation program
were fired for using peyote and sought unemployment compensa-
tion.238 When the request was denied, they sued, claiming that they
had used the peyote as part of a religious ceremony at their Native
American church. 239 Therefore, they argued that the denial violated
their First Amendment right to freely practice their religion.240 Jus-
tice Scalia, the author of the majority opinion, argued that a ruling
in favor of employees "would open the prospect of constitutionally
required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every
conceivable kind-ranging from compulsory military service, to the
payment of taxes, to health and safety regulation such as man-
slaughter and child neglect laws, compulsory vaccination laws, drug
laws, and traffic laws. .".."241
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor concluded that "the Free
Exercise Clause does not require the State to accommodate respond-
ents' religiously motivated conduct," as that "religiously motivated
conduct" unnecessarily interfered with fulfilling governmental pur-
poses. 242 Thus, the Court would not require selective exemptions
from generally applicable laws for religious beliefs. 243 Justice Scalia
further wrote that "[a]ny society adopting such a system would be
233. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
234. Id. at 698-99.
235. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
236. Texfi Indus., Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 269 S.E.2d 142, 150 (N.C.
1980).
237. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
238. Id. at 874.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 878.
241. Id. at 888-89.
242. Id. at 906 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
243. Id. at 888 (majority opinion).
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courting anarchy.. ."244 Conclusively, the Court held that to rule
in favor of the respondents "would open the prospect of constitution-
ally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost
every conceivable kind."245 The opinion stated overall that the Court
could not hold every law invalid based on individual religious objec-
tions, nor could it hold every regulation invalid that does not protect
an individual's highest interests.246 Congress reacted to Scalia's
Smith opinion by passing the RFRA three years later, which accord-
ing to its legislative history was supposed to incorporate the Court's
pre-Smith jurisprudence. 247
Corporations are also not exempt from the generally applicable
laws, and they are consistently held to higher requirements regard-
ing public service, accountability, and social responsibility. First,
this has been shown through corporations being subjected to more
regulation. 248 Second, there is an idea in the legal culture of theo-
retical discourse about corporate power and the proper mechanisms
for control of that corporate power.249 There is "sharp disagreement"
over what legal rights should go along with the modern understand-
ing of corporate personhood. 250 The concept of corporations as dis-
tinct persons facilitated wide-ranging regulation of corporations
themselves, and this dimension seems not to have been a step to
corporate formation, but instead reflected in a shared belief about
the proper focus of corporate activity. 251 The Supreme Court has
stated that "only through participation by the many in the responsi-
bilities and determinations of business can Americans secure the
moral and intellectual development which is essential to the
maintenance of liberty."252
As applied to modern corporations, there is seemingly no con-
sensus as to the approach taken when analyzing the application of
rights to corporations based on theories of entity or contract, alt-
hough the dominant underlying theme seems to be approached with
a real entity application. Although different amicus briefs took var-
ying approaches to this in the Hobby Lobby cases, many amicus
briefs supporting the government's position endorsed the real entity
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107
Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012)), invali-
dated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); S. REP. No. 103-111, at
2-3 (1993); Carlson, supra note 35.
248. Johnson, supra note 177, at 1137.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1141.
251. Id. at 1143-44.
252. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 580 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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theory of corporations. 253 Such briefs deemed a corporation a legal
entity separate and distinct from its shareholders. 254 The briefs
noted that "the corporate entity is distinct in its legal interest and
existence from those who contribute capital to it."255 The briefs ar-
gued:
It is well established that a corporation is a distinct and sepa-
rate entity, irrespective of the persons who own all its stock.
The fact that one person owns all of the stock does not make
him and the corporation one and the same person, nor does he
thereby become the owner of all the property of the corpora-
tion. The shares of stock of a corporation are essentially dis-
tinct and different from the corporate property.256
Additionally, shareholders do not conduct business as the corpora-
tion, but rather, the corporation does business as a distinct legal be-
ing.257
In fact, the Supreme Court has observed that "[i]ncorporation's
basic purpose is to create a distinct legal entity with legal rights,
obligations, powers, and privileges different from those of the natu-
ral individuals who created it, who own it, or whom it employs."258
Thus, the corporation and its officers, shareholders, and directors
are legally distinct from each other and therefore do not share equal
rights and responsibilities. 259 "Traditional corporate entity doctrine
draws a line between the owner and the corporation. No matter how
fuzzy that line becomes, the line separating the two entities always
exists."260 Accordingly, the existence of such a line of distinction be-
253. Brief of the Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. School of Law as
Amicus Curiae in Support of the Government at 13-15, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356), 2014 WL 334440 at
*13-14; Amicus Curiae Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors in Sup-
port of Petitioners at 3-4, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (Nos. 13-354, 13-356),
2014 WL 333889 at *4.
254. Amicus Curiae Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors in Sup-
port of Petitioners, supra note 253, at 3.
255. Id. at 4; see Barium Steel Corp. v. Wiley, 108 A.2d 336, 341 (Pa. 1954);
see also Kurtz v. Clark, 290 P.3d 779, 785 (Okla. Civ. App. 2012) (recognizing
"the legal concept of corporate entity under which stockholders as such lose
their individualities in the individuality of the corporation as a separate and
distinct person" (quoting Dobry v. Yukon Elec. Co., 290 P.2d 135, 137 (Okla.
1955))).
256. Amicus Curiae Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors in Sup-
port of Petitioners, supra note 253, at 5 (quoting Barium Steel, 108 A.2d at 341)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
257. Thomas E. Rutledge, A Corporation Has No Soul-The Business Entity
Law Response to Challenges to the PPACA Contraceptive Mandate, 5 WM. &
MARY Bus. L. REV. 1, 18 (2014).
258. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001).
259. Rutledge, supra note 257, at 23.
260. Michael J. Gaertner, Reverse Piercing the Corporate Veil: Should Cor-
poration Owners Have It Both Ways?, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 667, 667 (1989).
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tween a corporation and a person is a fundamental theory of corpo-
rate law.
The purpose behind establishing a corporation is to create a
separate and distinct legal entity that will afford limited liability to
the individual owners.261 Hobby Lobby and the similarly situated
businesses involved in the litigation were asking to keep the benefits
and protections of corporations, but also to receive special protec-
tions afforded to individuals and religious entities. The Court now
allows corporations to have it both ways via the decision in Hobby
Lobby. 262 However, employees and corporations are separate per-
sons, even if the employee is the sole owner of the corporation.263 As
the Court previously noted above, "After all, incorporation's basic
purpose is to create a distinct legal entity, with legal rights, obliga-
tions, powers, and privileges different from those of the natural in-
dividuals who created it, who own it, or whom it employs." 26 4
The Hobby Lobby decision puts into question the function of the
"corporate veil."26 5 The Supreme Court allowed the owners of a for-
profit corporation to profess their individual, personal religious
views and rights as applicable to a corporation, which "has poked a
major hole in the veil."266 The next Part of this Article discusses the
so-called values pass-through approach and how it comports with
traditional notions of corporate law. The values pass-through ap-
proach essentially dissolves the line between the corporation and its
owners, which seems counter to the notion of a corporation as a real
entity.267
III. CORPORATE VEIL PIERCING AND THE PASS-THROUGH APPROACH:
HAVING YOUR VEIL AND EATING IT Too
As the last Part noted, the more common vision of the corpora-
tion according to the Supreme Court is as a separate and distinct
legal entity from its owners, officers, directors, and shareholders,
with separate obligations. 268 However, in instances of fraud or
wrongful purpose, the courts look past the corporate entity and re-
261. David Gushee, Do For-Profit Corporations Have Religious Liberties?,
BAPTIST NEWS GLOBAL (Apr. 8, 2014), http://baptistnews.com/news/tem/28547-
do-for-profit-corporations -have-religious-liberties.
262. See id.
263. King, 533 U.S. at 163.
264. Id.
265. Alex Park, How Hobby Lobby Undermined the Very Idea of a Corpora-
tion, MOTHER JONES (July 3, 2014, 2:50 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo
/2014/07/hobby-lobbys-other-problem.
266. Id.
267. Gaertner, supra note 260.
268. See Socrates Peter Manoukian, Reverse Corporate Veil Piercing in Cali-
fornia Courts, ABTL REP. 1, 6 (May 26, 2010, 9:21 AM) http://www.abtl.org
/report/nc/abtlnorcalvoll9no2.pdf (citing Communist Party v. 522 Valencia, Inc.,
35 Cal. App. 4th 980, 993 (1995)).
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gard the actions to be those of the operators of the corporation, usu-
ally the owners in equity. 269 This is also known as "piercing the cor-
porate veil," where the abuse of the corporate privilege allows the
owners to be liable for the actions of the corporation. 270 The reverse
"piercing of the corporate veil" is different, and "strikes at the heart"
of the established corporate entity theory.271 Under the reverse
pierce, the corporation and its owner are seen as one legal entity,
and the line of distinction between the two becomes seemingly non-
existent.272
A brief was filed in response to the Hobby Lobby and Conestoga
Wood cases addressing the religious values of shareholders passing
through to the corporation itself.273 The brief argues that the "val-
ues pass [-]through" concept should be rejected, as to do otherwise
would be contrary to the established principles of corporate law, and
thus the concept of "reverse veil piercing" should be considered in-
applicable to the facts of Hobby Lobby.274 The privilege of limited
liability, which is protected by the corporate veil, is a corporation's
"most precious characteristic," and even if a single shareholder owns
one hundred percent of the corporation's shares, without significant
misconduct or fraud on the part of the shareholder, the corporate
veil cannot be pierced.275
The brief further asserts that the corporation is an instrument
of the State and is incorporated for the benefit of the public.276
Thus, allowing a corporation to assert the religious beliefs of its
shareholders in order to avoid having to comply with a generally ap-
plicable law with a secular purpose is fundamentally at odds with
the concept of incorporation. 277 Corporations and their shareholders
cannot hide behind the corporate veil on the one hand and ask
269. Id. at 1.
270. Id.
271. Gaertner, supra note 260.
272. Id.; see also Nicholas B. Allen, Reverse Piercing of the Corporate Veil: A
Straightforward Path to Justice, 85 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1147, 1154-55 (2011);
Peter B. Oh, Veil-Piercing, 89 TEX. L. REV. 81, 83 (2010) (stating that while the
first use of veil piercing is unknown, reverse veil piercing first appeared in
Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265, 267 (2d
Cir. 1929), when Judge Hand expressed a desire to limit the scope of the new
doctrine by writing that it may be "too much to say that a subsidiary can never
be liable for a transaction done in the name of a parent ... such instances, if
possible at all, must be extremely rare").
273. Amicus Curiae Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors in Sup-
port of Petitioners, supra note 253, at 2.
274. Id. at 2-3.
275. Id. at 7.
276. Id. at 12; see Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75 (1906), overruled in part
on other grounds by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52
(1964).
277. Amicus Curiae Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors in Sup-
port of Petitioners, supra note 253, at 7-8.
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courts to disregard it on the other.278 "One who has created a corpo-
rate arrangement, chosen as a means of carrying out his business
purposes, does not have the choice of disregarding the corporate en-
tity in order to avoid the obligations which the statute lays upon it
for the protection of the public."279
Further explained, Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood want to
engage in "insider reverse piercing,"280 a variation of reverse veil
piercing. 281 "The law generally does not allow the option of 'reverse
piercing' the corporate veil when it suits the corporation's owner." 28 2
In addition, piercing the corporate veil would carry with it unin-
tended consequences-making raising capital more challenging, re-
cruiting employees more difficult, and lessening the likelihood that
entrepreneurial energy will flourish. 28 3 Therefore, the concern be-
comes whether it would prevent a corporation from invoking religion
essentially at will in order to obtain exemptions from generally ap-
plicable laws and regulations that the corporation finds too costly.28 4
The response to reverse piercing in today's courts has been split,
with half supporting the doctrine and the other half rejecting it on
the basis of potential damage to shareholders, among other rea-
sons.28 5 As for the proponents of reverse veil piercing, there exist
two approaches: one being treating reverse veil piercing with the
same requirements as regular veil piercing, and the second being
enforcing additional requirements on reverse veil piercing in order
to ensure a stronger protection of interests.28 6 In addition to the
brief, there have been several additional arguments opposed to re-
verse piercing.28 7
278. Id. at 14.
279. Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United States, 326 U.S. 432, 437 (1946).
280. See Postal Instant Press, Inc., v. Kaswa Corp., 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 96, 101
(Ct. App. 2008) ("[A] corporate insider, or someone claiming through such indi-
vidual, attempt[s] to pierce the corporate veil from within so that the corporate
entity and the individual will be considered one and the same.").
281. Amicus Curiae Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors in Sup-
port of Petitioners, supra note 253, at 17.
282. Uniboard Aktiebolag v. Acer Am. Corp., 118 F. Supp. 2d 19, 25 (D.D.C.
2000).
283. Amicus Curiae Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors in Sup-
port of Petitioners, supra note 253, at 8.
284. Id. at 26-27.
285. Allen, supra note 272, at 1157-66.
286. Id. at 1157. For a detailed hypothetical explaining the two methods, see
id. at 1157-63.
287. See Floyd v. IRS, 151 F.3d 1295, 1300 (10th Cir. 1998) (adding that
there were alternative, less drastic remedies that could be afforded plaintiffs,
once again disagreeing with a general acceptance of reverse veil piercing and
that "[reverse veil piercing] is appropriately granted only in the absence of ade-
quate remedies at law"); Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d
1557, 1577 (10th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he reverse-pierce theory presents many prob-
lems. It bypasses normal judgment-collection procedures, whereby judgment
creditors attach the judgment debtor's shares in the corporation and not the
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In contrast, Professor Stephen Bainbridge argues that contrary
to the briefs arguments, basic corporate law principles strongly
support the position of Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood.288 In
particular, Bainbridge argues that reverse veil piercing provides a
clear and practical vehicle for disregarding the legal separateness of
those corporations from their shareholders and thus granting those
shareholders standing to assert their free exercise rights.28 9 Thus,
he asserts that although the brief asserts the well-established sepa-
rateness of the individual from the corporation, it is not absolute. 290
"[T]he corporate form can be set aside.., as a means of preventing
injustice or inequitable consequences." 291
Bainbridge is insinuating that the writers of the brief believe
that if a person incorporates a business in order to limit liability, he
or she would thereby lose his or her First Amendment protection.292
However, he goes on to say that when a person, or a group of people,
chooses to incorporate, it does not mean he or she sacrifices her First
Amendment rights. 293
In contrast, Professor Elizabeth Sepper argues that courts are
relying too much on this dangerous idea of "corporate conscience" to
allow profiting, secular businesses to get by without complying with
government mandates. 294 She contends that the courts that accept-
ed that businesses can have religious beliefs are rejecting founda-
tional elements of corporate law.295 In addition, she argues that
those same courts are "misunderstand[ing] the nature of health
benefits and the structure of the healthcare system in two funda-
mental ways."296 Sepper argues that "separateness of corporations
corporation's assets."); see also Allen, supra note 272, at 1164 (stating that some
courts have simply decided to side with Judge Hand in his opinion that "outside
reverse piercing is only appropriate in the rare case of a subsidiary dominating
its parent," and others reject its use in cases where the plaintiff has voluntarily
placed himself in the position of a creditor, as opposed to being in a position of
an involuntary creditor in a tort action).
288. According to Stephen Bainbridge, the amicus brief of forty-four law pro-
fessors is replete with errors, overstated claims, red herrings, and misdirection.
Bainbridge, supra note 185, at 1.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 4.
291. Id. (quoting Co-Ex Plastics, Inc. v. AlaPak, Inc., 536 So. 2d 37, 38 (Ala.
1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
292. Id. at 24.
293. Id.
294. Elizabeth Sepper, Contraception and the Birth of Corporate Conscience,
22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 303, 304 (2013).
295. Id.
296. Id. at 304-05 ("First, employee benefits are a form of compensation,
earned by and belonging to the employee like wages. By neglecting this eco-
nomic reality, courts draw incorrect conclusions about the legal and moral re-
sponsibility of employers for the contents of their employees' insurance plans
and thus about the burden that any regulation imposes .... Second, the Af-
fordable Care Act functions like other social insurance schemes, which require
172 [Vol. 50
2015] INEQUALITY IN HEALTH CARE COVERAGE 173
matters in doctrine" because "Hobby Lobby is Hobby Lobby, even
when the Green family no longer owns it."297 Furthermore, excusing
employers from the mandate would allow business owners to im-
permissibly interfere with the religious beliefs of the people who
work for them.298 Bainbridge rejects this concern, stating that it
"has no traction," using the idiom "he who pays the piper, calls the
tune."299 This seems to imply that the employer always has prece-
dence over employees, which seems counter to the nexus of contracts
approach to corporate personhood that Bainbridge supports. Bain-
bridge admits that reverse veil piercing has its flaws, but he still
maintains that it is far less than what Sepper claims when she calls
it a "blow to the foundation of corporate law" and "an enormous shift
in corporate law." 30 0 He endorses the belief that reverse veil pierc-
ing "vindicate [s] important rights. ' '3o1
However, even Bainbridge has not always taken this approach.
In a 2005 article, he wrote, "Veil piercing is rare, unprincipled, and
arbitrary. Such a doctrine is highly unlikely to consistently effect
socially beneficial policy outcomes. Instead, veil piercing achieves
neither fairness nor efficiency, but rather only uncertainty and lack
of predictability ... ,"302 Additionally, in his 2014 article, Bain-
bridge acknowledges such assertions, stating that he previously had
criticized and denounced veil piercing.3 03 He acknowledges that his
analysis would have to assume that the Court would not use the
Hobby Lobby case as a forum to adopt his "abolition proposals," thus
the employer to play an administrative and funding role. Courts fail to
acknowledge the social insurance function of recent health insurance reforms
and, therefore, do not properly situate contraceptive challenges within the doc-
trinal tradition of religious objections to social insurance, which have typically
failed. Finally, I suggest that successful challenges to healthcare reform based
on corporate conscience would destabilize the rights of employees and of women,
in particular, beyond the context of contraception.").
297. Elizabeth Sepper, Religion, Inc., A Reply to Bainbridge, CLS BLUE SKY
BLOG (Aug. 2, 2013), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/08/02/religion-inc-
a-reply-to-bainbridge/.
298. Id.
299. Id.; see also Stephen Bainbridge, A Corporate Conscience? I Don't
Think So, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (July 7, 2013),
http://www.professorbainbridge
.com/professorbainbridgecom2013/07/a-corporate-conscience-i-dont-think-
so.html.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing, 2005 U. ILL. L.
REV. 77, 78 (2005) (footnote omitted).
303. Bainbridge, supra note 185, at 7 n.28; see, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note
302, at 79 (arguing that the doctrine of veil piercing should be abolished in the
context of LLCs); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP.
L. 479, 481 (2001) (advocating for the abolition of the veil piercing doctrine).
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demonstrating his views are actually consistent with the opposition
of corporate veil piercing.30 4
In addition to the arguments raised in opposition to allowing
the Hobby Lobby corporate veil to be reverse pierced, it is important
to note that such allowance would lead to a slippery slope in litiga-
tion. Stating that an employer is "substantially burdened" by the
contraceptive mandate would lead to a slippery slope of letting em-
ployers voice religious concerns to providing a host of additional
medical services.30 5 If employers in charge of a corporation can
choose what medical services to provide to their employees based
solely on their personal religious beliefs, they would have the ability
"to interfere with many intimate, personal medical decisions of their
employees." 306
Justice Sotomayor raised this concern during the Hobby Lobby
oral argument when she asked counsel for Hobby Lobby, "Is your
claim limited to sensitive materials like contraceptives, or does it
include items like blood transfusion, vaccines? For some religions,
products made of pork? Is any claim under your theory that has a
religious basis, could an employer preclude the use of those items as
well?" 30 7 Justice Kagan also voiced her concern when addressing
that Congress had given statutory rights to women, including con-
traceptive coverage: "And when the employer says, no, I don't want
to give [contraceptive coverage], that woman is quite directly, quite
tangibly harmed."308
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood have taken advantage of the
benefits of incorporating.30 9 It is basic corporate law that they not
be allowed to disregard the wall of separation that incorporation re-
quires to promote their own self-dealing. 310 Their claims for estab-
lishing religious rights are based on arguments that are contrary to
well-established principles of corporate separateness. 31 1 The majori-
ty in Hobby Lobby ignored corporate law when making its cavalier
arguments that the corporation is a legal fiction but that it somehow
is capable of possessing its owners' religious beliefs.
In addition, these arguments harm employees and run counter
to the social responsibility corporations should demonstrate to their
employees. The next Part of this Article moves on from the corpo-
rate personhood and pass-through values debate to explore the con-
304. Bainbridge, supra note 185, at 7 n.28.
305. Evelyn M. Tenenbaum, The Union of Contraceptive Services and the
Affordable Care Act Gives Birth to First Amendment Concerns, 23 ALB. L.J. Sci.
& TECH. 539, 576 (2013).
306. Id. (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
307. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 11, at 4.
308. Id. at 36-37.
309. Amicus Curiae Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors in Sup-
port of Petitioners, supra note 253, at 13-14.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 28.
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cept of Corporate Social Responsibility ("CSR"). This Part argues
that providing health care and contraception are a part of CSR,
while taking away entitlements due to an owner's religious beliefs,
like Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood suggest, is actually counter
to the concept of CSR.
IV. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, RELIGION, AND
CONTRACEPTION
This Part of the Article describes how CSR relates to the ACA
Contraceptive Mandate cases and why it is an important corporate
law concept to consider in this discussion. In both the corporate and
academic world, there are many different definitions of CSR.312 CSR
has been defined as "a balanced approach for organizations to ad-
dress economic, social and environmental issues in a way that aims
to benefit people, communities and society," and it encompasses
many issues.313 CSR is also known as "corporate citizenship" and
can involve incurring short-term costs that do not provide an imme-
diate financial benefit to the company, but instead promote positive
social and environmental change. 314
While not mandatory in the United States, many large corpora-
tions have started devoting substantial amounts of time and money
to various CSR initiatives on a voluntary basis.315 The United Na-
tions Global Compact (the "Compact") is currently the world's larg-
est voluntary corporate responsibility initiative, and it encourages
corporations to align their strategies to focus on the areas of human
312. Alexander Dahlsrud, How Corporate Social Responsibility is Defined:
An Analysis of 37 Definitions, WILEY INTERSCIENCE 1, 1 (Nov. 6, 2006),
http://www.mcxindia.comcsr/newsarticle/pdf/csrnews45.pdf.
313. Denis Leonard & Rodney McAdam, Corporate Social Responsibility,
QUALITY PROGRESS 27, 27-28 (Oct. 2003), http://alexandrow.pdforms.texas-
quality.org/Sitelmages/125/Reference%2OLibrary/Social%2OResponsibility%20-
%20Leonard.pdf (quoting INT'L ORG. OF STANDARDIZATION, ISO/TMB AGCSR N4,
PRELIMINARY WORKING DEFINITION OF ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 1
(2002), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/standardsdefinition.pdf) (de-
scribing encompassed CSR issues as including human rights, workplace and
employee issues that include occupational health and safety, unfair business
practices, organizational governance, environmental issues, marketplace and
consumer issues, and community involvement).
314. Corporate Social Responsibility, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia
.comterms/c/corp-social-responsibility.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
315. See, e.g., Business Associations, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/business-associa
tions.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2015) (listing the membership of global business
associations by country, including businesses from the United States); Compa-
nies, WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT PRINCIPLES, http://www.weprinciples.org/Site
/Companies (last visited Feb. 12, 2015) (providing an option to search for signa-
tories of the CEO statement of support for the Women's Empowerment Princi-
ple and listing twenty-two business participants from the United States).
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rights, labor, environment, and anti-corruption. 316 Among its partic-
ipants, there are a great number of business associations that repre-
sent leading companies from around the world.317
The Compact has inspired other groups to band together in
support of specifically tailored causes that further the broader prin-
ciples proposed in it.318 The Women's Empowerment Principles are
a perfect example of this, serving as a set of principles for business
by offering guidance on how to empower women in the workplace,
marketplace, and community. 319 More than six hundred companies
have signed on to support women's empowerment. 320 This is just
one example of the many causes that are included in CSR, as gay-
marriage has been another area that has seen a lot of CSR support
as of late, with hundreds of companies speaking out against the De-
fense of Marriage Act ("DOMA").321
In sum, anything that affects sustainability, best practices, so-
cial welfare, or any number of other things could be considered a
CSR topic. The prevailing idea in a CSR topic is simply whether or
not the topic betters the world around the company.322 It is a notion
of corporations considering more than just the bottom line in their
business practices. 323 Given that CSR is almost completely unregu-
lated at this point, nearly any topic that deals with a corporation
bettering the world in some way can fall under the CSR umbrella.
Thus, the issue becomes whether the nature of the belief about
the CSR issue changes the result.324 For example, Tim Cook, chief
316. The Ten Principles, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/aboutthegc/TheTenprinciples/index.html (last
visited Feb. 12, 2015); UN Global Compact Participants, UNITED NATIONS GLOB-
GLOB-
AL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/bus
inessassociations.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2015) (stating that currently the
UN Global Compact has over 12,000 participants, including over 8000 business-
es in 145 countries around the world).
317. Business Associations, supra note 315.
318. See, e.g., Women's Empowerment Principles, WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT
PRINCIPLES, http://www.weprinciples.org/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2015) (stating
that the Women's Empowerment Principles are a result of a collaboration be-
tween UN Women and the UN Global Compact).
319. Id.
320. Companies, supra note 315.
321. Hundreds of Companies Support Gay-Marriage, CSRHuB (Mar. 14,
2013, 11:21 AM), http://www.csrhub.comblog/2013/O3/hundreds-of-companies-
support-gay-marriage.html.
322. See Dahlsrud, supra note 312, at 7-11 (listing thirty-seven definitions
of CSR that all reference an acknowledgement to bettering various aspects of
the world, not just the company).
323. See id. at 6 (stating that business "does not only have economic impact"
and that "the social, environmental and economic impacts should be optimally
balanced in decision making').
324. See Keith Paul Bishop, Should Corporations Conserve Water Because a
Shareholder Believes It's the Right Thing to Do?, CAL. CORP. & SEC. L. (Mar. 6,
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executive of Apple, has committed the company to slash greenhouse
gas emissions. 325 Apple has begun to curb its environmental impact,
promising not only to supply all of its power from reusable sources
but also to limit the use of minerals mined in the Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo, which funds war and human rights abuses.3 26 The fo-
cus then becomes how much leeway the law provides to directors to
focus on non-shareholder interests, as the object of corporate law is
to produce profits for the shareholders.3 27 Corporate directors have
the protection of the business judgment rule ("BJR") to make deci-
sions that they feel are in the best interest of the corporation. 328 The
BJR states that as long as the directors are adhering to their duty of
care and duty of loyalty, their decisions will not be second guessed
by a judge or a court. 329 Therefore, in the Apple example, as long as
Tim Cook and the other directors are acting with care and loyalty to
Apple, they are protected in their decision making, even if it is more
expensive to the shareholders or not the most profit-maximizing fi-
nancial decision. There is more to a director's decision making than
profits, and sometimes a reputation as an environment-friendly
company, or women-friendly corporation, can reap financial benefits
down the line. Thus, directors of corporations can avoid liability if
2014), http://calcorporatelaw.com/2014/03/should-corporations-conserve-water-
because-a-shareholder-believes-its-the-right-thing-to-do/ (stating that the Cali-
fornia Public Employees Retirement System ("CalPERS") sent a letter to its
managers requesting the company take steps to conserve water). The company
exclaims that taking conservation measures is the right thing to do and that it
reflects its investment beliefs. See id. Apparently, the author is suggesting
that CalPERS believes corporations have beliefs, and the corporations it invests
in should behave in accordance with those beliefs. The author refers to the
amicus brief written by forty-four lawyers requesting the court to reject the
"values pass through theory," in which corporations impose their religious be-
liefs on their shareholders and employees. Id. The author concludes by ques-
tioning whether water conservation is different than religious beliefs. Id.
325. Jessica Shankleman, Tim Cook Tells Climate Change Skeptics to Ditch
Apple Shares, THEGUARDIAN (Mar. 3 2014), http://www.theguardian.com
/environment/2014/mar/03/tim-cook-climate-change-sceptics-ditch-apple-shares.
326. See id. In response to Apple's efforts to fight climate change, Justin
Danhof of the NCPPR challenged Apple's environmental investments and
whether the benefits outweighed the cost. Id. Danhof and the NCPPR have
accused Cook and Apple of not having the best interests of its shareholders. Id.
They want Cook to invest only in profitable measures, and Cook, in response,
said that "securing a return on investment was not the only reason for investing
in environmental measures." Id. Cook is dedicated to reducing Apple's "envi-
ronmental footprint" and leaving "the world better than we found it." Id.
327. Stephen Bainbridge, Can Tim Cook Ignore ROI When Deciding How to
Design an iPhone?, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Mar. 7, 2014, 8:46 AM),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecoml2014/03/can-tim-
cook-ignore-roi-when-deciding-how-to-design-an-iphone.html.
328. The Business Judgment Rule, NAT'L PARALEGAL C.,
http://nationalparalegal.edupublic-documents/courseware-asp-files[businessLa
w/Directors&Officers/BusinessJudgmentRule.asp (last visited Feb. 12, 2015).
329. Id.
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they can make an argument that the decision could lead to long-
term value for the shareholders. 330 For Apple, the likeminded
shareholders may buy more shares and sue less frequently, custom-
ers may buy more, and employee turnover may be reduced, all the
while increasing profitability in the long term.331 The law allows
board of directors' substantial discretion to consider the impact of
their decisions on interests other than shareholder profits as a con-
sequence of the BJR.332 There is case law to suggest that directors
do not need to treat shareholder wealth maximization as their sole
objective. 333
The broad definition of CSR has stirred up much debate regard-
ing whether or not contraception should be seen as a CSR issue. 334
This has become particularly relevant in light of the Hobby Lobby I
and Conestoga Wood I cases. 335 There are many who argue that ac-
cess to contraception is a fundamental component of CSR.336 Con-
traceptive coverage benefits both the company and the world at
large.337 After developing a model that incorporates factors like the
costs of contraception, costs of unintended pregnancy, and indirect
costs, Global Health Outcomes found that it actually saves employ-
ers ninety-seven dollars per year per employee to offer a comprehen-
sive contraceptive benefit plan.338
330. Bainbridge, supra note 327.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at nn.3, 5.
334. John P. Vail, Lessons on Corporate Values from Hobby Lobby, LAW360
(Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.law360.com/corporate/articles/569885/lessons-on-
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There are numerous health benefits in the use of contraception,
including healthier planned pregnancies, preventing unintended
pregnancies, reducing the number of abortions, and lowering ac-
counts of death or disability in relation to pregnancy complica-
tions.339 Family planning has many health benefits for mothers spe-
cifically, as pregnancies that occur too early or late in life can have a
negative effect on the health of the mother and could lead to prema-
turity or low birth weight in children.3 40 As stated by the HHS, fam-
ily planning is a "women's health issue" and a "national health goal"
because contraceptives assist in the prevention of both economic and
social costs of an unplanned pregnancy. 341 It is said that the long-
term benefits of the use of contraception span from increased educa-
tion for women, to better health of children, to greater family sav-
ings.342 Additionally, it stands uncontested that as determined by
the HRSA, "contraceptive services are essential for women's
health."343
The economic benefits of providing coverage for contraceptives
under the ACA are also well documented. Making women's contra-
ceptives affordable without cost sharing will result in lower overall
health-care costs, as it would result in healthier mothers and chil-
dren and reduce the number of abortions. 344 Many contraceptives
can cost $50 to $60 per month, which is not an affordable monthly
expense for many.3 45 Out-of-pocket costs for the birth control pill
alone can be anywhere from $180 to $960 per year, which results in
added annual out-of-pocket costs for office visits to the doctor rang-
ing from $35 to $250.346 Additionally, IUDs can cost up to $1000
every five to ten years.347 Therefore, the economic benefit conferred
by no-cost sharing provisions of contraception and family planning
aids as provided by employer-based insurance could be upwards of
$1200 per year, thereby including women who would not be able to
afford to take such measures without such coverage. 348 Balancing
these factors with statistics that show that the average amount for
339. Costs and Benefits of Investing in Contraceptive Services in the Develop-
ing World, GUrrMACHER INST. (June 2012), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-
Costs-Benefits-Contraceptives.html.
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insurers for one pregnancy is $10,000 demonstrates the cost-savings
and economic benefit not only to women, but also to employers in
general. 349
Therefore, contraceptive coverage on the part of the employers
would allow women to have their choice of the full selection of con-
traceptive care, including the most effective, yet also more expensive
options. Aside from the obvious cost-effective benefits, further ad-
vantages of employer contraceptive coverage can be seen in reduced
employee absenteeism and increased overall worker satisfaction.350
Some argue that the law establishes the minimum that social
actors must do and for which society expects, 351 but CSR asks com-
panies to do more than their legal obligation. 352 Justice Alito seems
to ignore this concept in his majority opinion when he notes that
profit is not the only motive for a for-profit corporation. 353 Although
that may be true, unlike the CEO of Apple, the owners of Hobby
Lobby are not asking to do more. They want to provide less than the
required standard of the ACA. 354 In essence, Hobby Lobby will leave
its employees without access to the contraceptive medicine afforded
under federal law. 355 Thus, it is not whether a corporation can run
its company according to its religious beliefs; the issue instead is
whether a company should be allowed to do less than its competi-
tion. 356 If religion is used as an excuse to be exempt from legal regu-
lations and requirements and by doing so saves on costs and gains a
competitive edge, the incentives to claim religious exemptions could
spring up on many issues. 357 Religion should not enable a company
to do less than what is required; one should expect religion to do
more.358 The owner's individual values or beliefs should not be used
to excuse corporations from compliance nor should it lower the
standards for corporate actions.3 59 Thus, it is abundantly clear that
contraception is a CSR issue. In fact, providing health care in gen-
eral can be seen as a CSR issue. The federal government passed the
ACA with a desire to even the playing field in the health-care sector,
349. Richardson, supra note 337.
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between rich and poor, and between men and women. 360 However,
the enormity of these benefits has been lost in the vicious and parti-
san debate about the ACA. In the last Part of this Article, I high-
light the benefits of the ACA for women's health generally, not just
their reproductive health. By focusing only on the contraceptive
mandate, the far-reaching policy potential of the ACA to help elimi-
nate gender inequality in the workplace and in health care has been
obscured.
V. ACA, GENDER EQUALITY, AND THE WORKPLACE
This Article has analyzed the arguments made in the ACA Con-
traceptive Mandate through a corporate law lens, examining various
personhood theories, the ill-advised values pass-through theory, and
CSR. This final Part takes a macro view of the ACA and highlights
some of the benefits of the ACA for women beyond contraception.
There are important financial and health equalizing provisions in
the ACA, yet the contraceptive debate has drowned out the discus-
sion of many of these benefits.
First, there exist several studies demonstrating that even mod-
erate co-pays for health services, specifically with preventative care
services for women, result in fewer women obtaining preventative
health care, as they forego such care due to cost barriers.36 1 The
ACA levels the playing field for women in terms of insurance cover-
age and health-care access as the ACA provides access to important
care and life-saving screenings.3 62 With the enactment of the ACA,
there are numerous health-care benefits provided that directly affect
women; specifically there are eight new categories of preventative
services that are available to women without a cost-sharing fea-
ture.363 It is estimated that on August 1, 2012, approximately forty-
seven million women gained guaranteed access to these services
without paying more out of pocket.364 All health plans are required
to offer essential health services such as hospitalization, maternity
care, and prescription drugs, in addition to providing preventative
care.365 The preventative care services were comprised of specific
360. See generally Strategic Goal 1: Strengthen Health Care, HHS Strategic
Plan, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.hhs.gov
/strategic-planlgoall.html#obj-e (discussing the purpose behind the Affordable
Care Act and how HHS intends to accomplish those goals).
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recommendations made by the Institute of Medicine and adopted by
the HHS.366 As these recommendations include several categories of
essential health benefits, it is clear that the ACA makes numerous
necessary services available to women and is not limited solely to
contraception. In addition to the contraception coverage and contra-
ceptive counseling, these preventative care recommendations in-
clude women's annual wellness visits; gestational diabetes screen-
ing; HPV DNA testing; sexually transmitted infections (STI) coun-
seling; HIV screening and counseling; breastfeeding support, sup-
plies, and counseling; and domestic violence screening and counsel-
ing.367 It is worth noting that all of these preventative care services
are essential in keeping women healthy.368
The overall cost of preventative health care has been a substan-
tial barrier for many women.369 The ACA subsidizes health insur-
ance for those who lack affordable employer health insurance, which
will particularly help women, who on average earn a lower income
than men.370 Additionally, women have previously been charged
more, paying higher out-of-pocket costs and premiums than men for
the same health-care coverage.37 1 Forty-two states had previously
allowed insurance companies to charge women more for health care,
solely because they were women.37 2 The largest antidiscrimination
equalizer may be that the ACA bans such gender rating, as the ACA
prohibits insurers' widespread practice of charging women higher
premiums than charged to men of the same age, including regularly
charging female nonsmokers more than male smokers. 373 Addition-
ally, and for the first time, the ACA prohibits gender discrimination
in federal health programs, health programs receiving federal dol-
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lars, and other programs, including the health insurance exchang-
es.
374
Moreover, throughout a recent three-year period, thirty-eight
percent of women who attempted to get insurance coverage were
either rejected, charged an elevated premium, or sold policies that
excluded certain benefits because of preexisting conditions, like hav-
ing been pregnant or having cancer. 375 Previous specific examples of
this include that some insurers deemed women to have a preexisting
condition if they had before given birth by Caesarean section, were
pregnant at the time they sought coverage, had survived domestic
violence and received treatment related to abuse, or received medi-
cal treatment after sexual assault. 76 The ACA prohibits this prac-
tice and requires insurers to sell insurance to anyone who wants to
buy coverage (known as "guaranteed issue"), and thus, to the benefit
of women, the ACA bans such preexisting condition exclusions. 377
Additionally, the ACA guarantees maternity coverage for all women,
because under the ACA, maternity care is an "essential health bene-
fit" that plans must cover.378 Prior to the ACA, only twelve percent
of plans sold on the individual market even offered maternity cover-
age, which was frequently inadequate because of waiting periods or
deductibles that could be as high as the cost of the birth itself.379
The ACA changes that and does not allow pregnancy discrimination,
and overall the ACA ends many insurer practices that largely disad-
vantage women in general. 38 0
Thus, beginning in 2014, women are no longer denied health-
care coverage due to a preexisting medical condition, and women can
have access to preventative health services at no additional out-of-
pocket cost.38 1 Additionally, the HHS estimated that 18.6 million
uninsured women would be eligible for health-care coverage, leading
to fewer uninsured women and families and to an improvement in
access to preventative health care.38 2 Accordingly, the ACA makes
comprehensive health insurance more available and affordable, and
374. Nondiscrimination Protection in the Affordable Care Act: Section 1557,
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"quite simply, reform is making affordable, quality health care more
of a reality for women and their families."
83
Furthermore, there are particular groups of women that are
substantially helped by the ACA.384 More low-income women have
access to family planning services due to the expansion of Medicaid
eligibility for family planning services. 385 Also, unique health needs
of women had formerly placed them at a disadvantage in the work-
force compared to their male coworkers. 38 6 Even nursing mothers
are afforded protection, as the ACA requires employers with more
than fifty employees to provide breaks and a private place for nurs-
ing mothers to express breast milk, thereby making the extensive
benefits of breastfeeding more widely available to mothers and chil-
dren.38 7
Expectant parents will be provided professional parenting ad-
vice, resources, and support.38 8 Senior women will have access to
coordinated care, thereby helping to prevent dangerous drug inter-
actions, duplicative tests and procedures, and conflicting diagno-
ses.38 9 The most "egregious consequences" of the pre-ACA insurance
schemes had affected low-income families and individuals. 390 How-
ever, under the ACA, low and middle-income families will receive
tax credits, which will assist in making the health-care coverage af-
fordable.391 Thus, seven million women who did not have insurance
would be able to receive assistance in covering part of the family's
health insurance premium, making family coverage more afforda-
ble.392
Additionally, more low-income adults will be eligible for Medi-
caid under the ACA, specifically, ten million uninsured women may
be able to get health coverage through Medicaid. 393 Through the
ACA's prohibition of exclusions due to preexisting conditions, deni-
als of coverage, and higher rates for people with health problems,
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and with the addition of financial help in obtaining coverage, the
ACA increases access to medically necessary care, thus "saving lives
as well as family resources."3 94 As a result, it is clear that the ACA
facilitates an end to insurer practices that directly harm women.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's conclusion about corporate personhood in
Hobby Lobby was short sighted from a corporate law perspective, as
well as from a macro level view of gender and the ACA. As this Ar-
ticle has demonstrated, regardless of the theory of the corporation
that one ascribes to, the rights of the female employees trumps the
owner's rights in the ACA context. This Article concludes that a for-
profit corporation cannot and should not be able to be deemed as
having religious beliefs. Thus, the majority's position in Hobby Lob-
by does not comport with corporate law and will begin a slippery
slope that will potentially harm women, minorities, and other vul-
nerable populations. The ACA's contraception provisions are only a
small, albeit important, part of the ACA. The obsessive focus on
contraception has caused many of the other benefits of the ACA for
women's health-care coverage to be ignored. Using legal arguments
counter to corporate law to escape the ACA fundamentally harms
female employees. The rights of female employees are as important
as the religious rights of employers and more important than the
nonexistent religious rights of a corporation.
394. Blumberg, supra note 390, at 6.

